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BUYER BEWARE: 
WHY JOHNS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH 
STATUTORY RAPE FOR BUYING SEX FROM A 
CHILD 
 
Amanda Shapiro* 
 
Despite the common conception that human trafficking is pri-
marily a problem beyond our shores, sex trafficking is a growing 
epidemic within the United States. Sex traffickers are increasingly 
preying on children in particular in response to growing demand 
for paid sex with younger girls and boys. Strikingly, the criminal 
justice system charges and prosecutes these trafficking victims for 
selling sex even though they have been forced into the trade. Un-
like trafficked children, the adults who buy sex from them are rare-
ly charged and, if they are, the charge—a low-level misdemeanor 
or violation—fails to reflect the gravity of their crime. Take away 
the exchange of money, and the justice system appropriately deems 
these children victims and their patrons rapists for engaging in the 
exact same acts. 
This Note argues that prosecutors should prosecute these adult 
patrons, also known as johns, with statutory rape. Their conduct 
constitutes child rape whether money is exchanged or not. The 
current charges of misdemeanors and violations are inadequate to 
reflect the severity of their crimes. By contrast, statutory rape is, in 
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every state, a felony offense that imposes strict liability on an adult 
who has sex with a child under a certain age. Charging johns with 
an offense that more accurately reflects their criminality would re-
inforce the notion that children trafficked into the sex industry are 
victims, not criminals, and that the law must similarly treat traf-
ficked and non-trafficked children. Additionally, the heightened 
penalty would decrease demand for trafficked children by deter-
ring johns from participating in and thus driving the child sex 
market. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  Statutory Rape: Two Different Outcomes 
 
Nina1 met her long-term high school boyfriend when they 
locked eyes in study hall. They became fast friends. Soon after, 
they fell in love. Although their relationship had an age gap—Nina 
was fifteen and her boyfriend was eighteen—that did not stop them 
from imagining a blissful future together. They talked about 
marriage, buying a house, and raising children together. They had 
sex, but sex was not what defined their relationship. The pair could 
wile away hours just talking. Nina’s father, however, felt that Nina 
was spending too much time with her new boyfriend, so he 
reported their sexual relationship to the police in the hopes of 
separating them. The police charged Nina’s boyfriend with 
statutory rape, a felony offense. As a result of his conviction, 
Nina’s boyfriend was registered as a sex offender and is now 
serving ten years probation.2 
                                                            
1  Names have been fabricated or changed. This narrative has been adapted 
from an article that ran in the Hartford Courant, “A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex 
Offenders.” Hilda Munoz, A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex Offenders, HARTFORD 
COURANT (May 3, 2007), http://articles.courant.com/2007-05-
03/news/0705030904_1_offender-statutory-sexual. See also Meredith Cohen, 
Note, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 721–22 (2008) 
(discussing the incident).  
2 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 722. See generally Michele Goodwin, Law’s 
Limits: Regulating Statutory Rape Law, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 481, 540 (2013) 
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Vivian,3 on the other hand, did not have a chance to fall in love 
the way Nina did. When Vivian was fifteen years old, her father 
decided that he was tired of paying child support to her mother. In 
an effort to stave off the mounting debts, Vivian’s father arranged 
for a male friend to kidnap her for use as human collateral. Her 
father’s friend told Vivian that she had to sell her body for sex in 
order to pay off debts her father owed him, and beat her when she 
resisted. The man—now Vivian’s “pimp”—scheduled the first 
“customer,” a forty-year-old man, to buy her sexual services. This 
customer saw her black eye and other bruises all over her body. 
After noting her young features, he had sex with her anyway. The 
entire fee went to Vivian’s pimp.  
Unlike the authorities who arrested Nina’s young boyfriend, 
the police here neither arrested nor charged the man who bought 
sex from Vivian.4 Even if the police had arrested him and the local 
prosecutor had pressed charges, the charge would have been either 
a simple violation5—the equivalent of failing to use one’s turn 
signal while driving6—or a misdemeanor offense,7 neither of 
                                                            
(arguing that statutory rape laws, as applied now, lead to absurd criminal results 
for teenage, consensual sexual activity). 
3 This narrative has been adapted from children’s experiences recorded in 
an in-depth study in New York City on child victims of sex trafficking. See RIC 
CURTIS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY: VOL. ONE 47–48 (2008). 
4 See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 265 (15th ed. 
2014) (indicating a “reluctance on the part of law enforcement officers to arrest 
patrons”) (citations omitted); see also 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 14 (2014) 
(noting that some courts interpret prostitution statutes as being inapplicable to 
patrons) (citations omitted). 
5 See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 265 (citing the Model Penal Code, which 
criminalizes a patron of prostitution: “[a] person commits a violation if he hires 
a prostitute to engage in sexual activity with him . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 
251.2(5) (2012) (emphasis added)). The offense of “prostitution” (i.e. offering or 
engaging in sexual activity for money) under the Model Penal Code is a “petty 
misdemeanor.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2(5) (2012). 
6 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW art. 28, § 1163 (McKinney 2014). 
7 See TORCIA, supra note 4 (citing typical patron offenses, ranging from 
Class A to Class B misdemeanors, e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83 (West 
2013)); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5614 (2013);  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1343 
(2013)). 
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which often leads to serving jail time.8 On the other hand, the 
authorities likely would have charged Vivian with a crime9—even 
though she was a juvenile, and even though, in the sexual crimes 
provisions of the penal code, she was legally incapable of 
consenting to any sexual activity.10 
The criminalization of prostitution—specifically, the 
criminalization of people selling their bodies for sex—has so 
warped the criminal justice system that a child forced into sex 
would likely be convicted of prostitution, while the person who 
raped11 her would receive a mere warning, if any criminal 
                                                            
8 First-time offenders rarely serve jail time, even for a misdemeanor, and 
diversion options allow johns to easily have their charges dismissed. See 
MICHAEL SHIVELY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF 
PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION EFFORTS, FINAL 
REPORT 10 (2012), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
238796.pdf. 
9 See Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging 
Legal Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“[Y]oung girls are prosecuted at reportedly higher 
rates than even the men who exploit them.”) (citations omitted). 
10 See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“A child of tender years is deemed 
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; therefore, the child’s apparent 
‘consent’ is immaterial.”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(3)(a) (West 
2013) (“A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is: . . . [l]ess 
than sixteen (16) years old.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(9) (West 2013) 
(“An act of sexual intercourse [or] rape . . . is without the consent of the victim . 
. . [if] the victim is younger than 14 years of age.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
761(k) (2013) (“A child who has not yet reached that child’s sixteenth birthday 
is deemed unable to consent to a sexual act with a person more than 4 years 
older than said child. Children who have not yet reached their twelfth birthday 
are deemed unable to consent to a sexual act under any circumstances.”). 
11 This note uses the term “sexual assault” here since most penal codes 
criminalize statutory rape as some degree of “sexual assault” or “rape.” See, e.g., 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (2013) (“A person is guilty of gross 
sexual assault if that person engages in sexual act with another person and . . . 
the other person . . . has not in fact attained the age of 14 years.”) (emphasis 
added); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(1)(l) (“A person is guilty of the felony 
of aggravated felonious sexual assault if such person engages in sexual 
penetration with another person . . . [w]hen the victim is less than 13 years of 
age.”) (emphasis added); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“Sexual 
Assault . . . No person shall engage in a sexual act with a child who is under the 
age of 16 . . . .”) (emphasis added); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013) 
 BUYER BEWARE 453 
sanctions.  Under  the  sexual assault provisions of most penal 
codes in the United States, Vivian legally meets the definition of a 
victim of statutory rape, and the man who used her for sex, a 
felon.12   The intent  behind  statutory  rape  legislation is to protect 
children from predatory, coercive adults.13 Nina’s boyfriend, a 
teenager in the throes of young love, is not the menace society 
wants to criminalize  for  statutory  rape. On the other hand, 
adults14 who buy sex from children forced into the sex trade—
                                                            
(“Rape . . . is the penetration . . . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . . 
accomplished . . . [w]here the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years and 
the perpetrator is eighteen (18) years of age or older.”) (emphasis added); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.050(1)(a) (West 2013) (“A person is guilty of rape in 
the second degree when . . . [b]eing eighteen (18) years old or more, he engages 
in sexual intercourse with another person less than fourteen (14) years old . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2014) (“A person 
is guilty of rape in the second degree when . . . being eighteen years old or 
more,  he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than 
fifteen years old . . . .”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.375(1)(b) 
(West 2013) (“A person who has sexual intercourse with another person 
commits the crime of rape in the first degree if . . . [t]he victim is under 12 years 
of age.”) (emphasis added). 
12 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 771(a)(1) (2013) (“A person is 
guilty of rape in the third degree when the person . . . [i]ntentionally engages in 
sexual intercourse with another person and the victim has not reached that 
victim’s sixteenth birthday and the person is at least 10 years older than the 
victim . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2013) (“A person commits the 
offense of statutory rape when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with any 
person under the age of 16 years . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013) 
(“Rape . . . is the penetration . . . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . . [w]here 
the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is eighteen 
(18) years of age or older.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“No 
person shall engage in a sexual act with a child who is under the age of 16 . . . 
.”).  Vivian’s experience also carries implications for a level of sexual assault 
even higher than statutory rape, given that the offender seemed to know he was 
forcing her into sex. See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“Although force is not an 
element of statutory rape, if a defendant does use force, he may be guilty of 
common-law (forcible) rape even with respect to a female who is under the age 
of consent.”) (citations omitted). 
13 Tamar R. Birkhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, 
and Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1096 (2011). 
14 Women and men have been perpetrators of both statutory rape and 
patronizing a prostitute, but the vast majority of adults who drive the prostitution 
industry are men; and the majority of child victims are girls. See, e.g., CURTIS ET 
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regardless of whether they know their victim is a child—are 
exactly the population our society would wish to criminalize 
through statutory rape laws.15 
This Note describes how children of the commercial sex 
industry are victimized twice: first, by the sexual exploitation 
itself, and second, by a criminal justice system that criminalizes 
them for being exploited.16 The use of prostitution laws against 
minors in this country remains inequitable: children incapable of 
consenting to sex are charged with prostitution, while the adults 
who raped them are ignored or dismissed. This Note argues that a 
deep legal and societal misunderstanding of prostitution, which 
views prostitutes as reckless unchaste women, drives both the 
criminalization of child victims of the sex trade and the lack of 
criminalization of the adults who buy sex from them. This Note 
then argues that prosecutors should remedy this injustice and 
                                                            
AL., supra note 3, at 79 (The researchers discovered a surprising number of 
female johns who had bought sex from both male and female child victims. 
However, researchers were somewhat skeptical of the figures reported by male 
child victims about female johns because of the “stigma attached to 
homosexuality,” therefore “admitting that [their] clientele was exclusively male 
was difficult.”); see also Global Sex Trafficking Fact Sheet, EQUALITY NOW, 
http://www.equalitynow.org/node/1010 (last visited September 15, 2014) 
(Worldwide, 98% of commercial sexual exploitation victims are female.); 
Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R41878, p. 7 (June 21, 2011), available 
at https://d1qkyo3pi1c9bx.cloudfront.net/ 00028B1B-B0DB-4FCD-A991-
219527535DAB/7ad602de-1738-4ccf-983f-7ed0b20a37fb.pdf (“[M]ost victims 
of sex trafficking in the U.S. are women and children.”). 
15 Cf. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: 
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2000) 
(discussing the worst of statutory rape crimes, where an adult preys on a young 
child for sexual gratification). Though Oberman is certainly correct that 
statutory rape involves greater culpability when there is specific intent, it is my 
proposition that policy considerations weigh in favor of a law that targets both 
those with intent to rape minors and those without that specific intent.  
16 While addressing the need to decriminalize the child victims of this 
industry is one aspect of remedying this injustice, it is beyond the scope of this 
Note, and has already been analyzed admirably. See generally Annitto, supra 
note 9; Birkhead, supra note 13; Rebecca Carroll Sager, An Anomaly of the 
Law: Insufficient State Laws Fail to Protect Minor Victims of Sex Trafficking, 
38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 359 (2012); Cynthia Godsoe, 
Punishing to Protect, 52 HOUS. LAW REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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inconsistency in the law by charging such adults with statutory 
rape. This solution is advantageous because it does not require 
enacting new legislation or dramatically altering the criminal 
justice system. It merely requires that prosecutors use their 
discretion to charge people who buy sex from children with the 
higher offense of statutory rape rather than the misdemeanor 
offense of soliciting a prostitute. 
Charging these offenders with statutory rape would serve three 
purposes. First, it would reinforce the notion that these children are 
victimized youth who are incapable of consenting to sexual 
activity, and that the law should protect rather than punish them. 
Second, it would provide consistency in the law for courts that 
have long grappled with the dilemma of criminalizing children for 
their own rapes. Third, a felony charge against these perpetrators 
would decrease the demand for child trafficking by using the 
threats of both significant jail time and a felony record to deter 
potential buyers. 
Part I of this Note frames the problem of the sexual 
exploitation of children as a prosecutorial failure of underusing 
statutory rape. It provides a definitions section, which clarifies the 
terms used in this Note in order to more aptly describe the 
experiences of child victims of sexual exploitation. Part II.A 
identifies the victims of commercial sexual exploitation and details 
the methods by which adults lure them into exploitation. Part II.B 
describes recent state sex trafficking statutes aimed at confronting 
this exploitation and discusses the gross limitations in even the 
most robust statutes. Part II.C lists the reasons why law 
enforcement continues to arrest and prosecute children for their 
own rapes. Part III frames these reasons within the larger context 
of the unjust criminalization of adults who sell sex and the lack of 
criminalization of the adults who buy sex. Part IV details the 
superiority of a statutory rape-charging mechanism over other 
proposals for child exploitation reform. Part IV also cites the 
overall lack of charges against adults who buy sex from children 
and instances where a statutory rape charge would have proved 
useful. Finally, Part V concludes with the limitations of this Note’s 
solution and invites policymakers to remedy the other identified 
factors that force children into sexual exploitation. 
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I.   THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: DEFINITION OF 
TERMS 
 
Defining terms is not only useful for the consistency and clarity 
of this Note, but it is also an important step in achieving justice for 
victims. The road to justice often begins with public awareness. At 
the moment, the focus on the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children is on children as “prostitutes”17 and traffickers as 
“pimps.”18 By shifting the rhetoric from prostitute to victim, from 
pimp to trafficker, and from customer to perpetrator, this Note 
seeks to disclose the experiences of children in the commercial sex 
industry. 
 
A.   Victims of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
(CSEC) 
 
This Note will refer to minors engaged in prostitution as 
“victims of the commercial sexual exploitation of children 
(CSEC),”19 and will focus largely on domestic victims. Academics 
                                                            
17 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, For Runaways, Sex Buys Survival, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/us/27runaways.html 
?pagewanted=all (referring to a victim of sexual exploitation as both “a petite 
16-year-old girl” and “a prostitute”); see also Larry Neumeister, Lawrence 
Taylor Wins Case Brought by Teen Alleging Sexual Assault in New York Hotel, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/26/ 
lawrence-taylor-wins-case-teen-sexual-assault_n_2025289.html (using the term 
“underage prostitute”); Laura Italiano, Former Sportscaster Marvell Scott 
Pleads Guilty in Child Prostitute Case, N.Y. POST (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://nypost.com/2011/08/16/former-sportscaster-marvell-scott-pleads-guilty-
in-child-prostitute-case/ (referring to victim as “child prostitute”). 
18 See, e.g., The Associated Press, Father and Son Pimps Are Sentenced to 
3 to 9 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/nyregion/father-and-son-pimps-are-
sentenced-to-3-to-9-years-in-prison.html?_r=0. The MTV series Pimp My Ride 
even uses the term “pimp” as a verb meaning improvement in the context of 
turning “clunker” cars into “masterpieces.” Pimp My Ride: About Pimp My 
Ride, MTV, http://www.mtv.com/shows/pimp_my_ride/season_5/series.jhtml 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (follow “Read Full Summary”). 
19 Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) also encompasses 
“child pornography, online enticement, [and] child sex tourism.” Office of 
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and legal scholars have adopted the term CSEC to describe the 
exploitation of children not just by sexual traffickers, but also by 
adults who purchase sexual services, or otherwise recruit youth to 
participate in the sex industry.20 The term “child prostitute,” 
though widely used in popular media,21 is problematic. The 
Department of Justice notes that the label “prostitute” perpetuates 
misinformed ideas: “[u]sing the term prostitution in connection 
with children . . . implies the idea of choice, when in fact that is not 
the case.”22 The real danger is that the term “child prostitute” 
evokes an idea that CSEC “is somehow different from other forms 
of rape or sexual abuse of minors”—a more acceptable one.23 
Rachel Lloyd, the founder of the non-profit Girls Educational and 
Mentoring Services (GEMS), which serves trafficked girls, 
illustrates how the “prostitute” label can serve to justify an adult’s 
decision to buy sex from a child: “[m]any of these men wouldn’t 
                                                            
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
of Children, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last visited Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/csec_program.html. For the purposes of 
charging johns with statutory rape, this Note limits CSEC to “juveniles who 
perform sexual acts in exchange for money, drugs, food or shelter.” CURTIS ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 1. The forced prostitution of children has also been referred 
to as “minor sex trafficking.” Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, FLORIDA 
COUNCIL AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (last visited Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.fcasv.org/child-sexual-abuse/domestic-minor-sex-trafficking.    
20 See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, U. PA. SCH. OF SOC. 
WORK, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., 
CANADA, AND MEXICO 2 (2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/ 
docs/sextrade/upenncsec90701.pdf. 
21 The mainstream media commonly refer to the CSEC problem as child or 
juvenile “prostitution.” See HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT FOR GIRLS & THE RABEN 
GROUP, USE OF THE PHRASE “CHILD PROSTITUTE” IN THE MEDIA 1 (2013), 
available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/807686_acbe2dfa7dde42a89c716f556 
a1b12fe.pdf (citing over 5,000 instances in the last 5 years when reporters have 
used the term “child prostitute” or “child prostitution”). See generally supra note 
17 (providing examples of the media referring to underage victims of sexual 
exploitation as prostitutes).    
22 Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, The Prostitution of Children, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/ 
prostitution.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
23 HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT FOR GIRLS, supra note 21. 
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dream of sexually abusing their daughters, but when it comes to a 
‘prostitute’ . . . they figure it doesn’t really matter.”24 
 
B.    Prostituted People and Prostitution 
 
This Note will refer to adults who sell their own sexual 
services as “prostituted people” and “prostituted women.” 
Referring  to  adults  engaged  in  the  sex  industry  as  
“prostituted” reflects that a large majority of women in prostitution 
wish to exit the commercial sex industry.25  Moreover, control over 
their work is minimal: of the people who sell sex, 80% are under 
the control of a pimp or trafficker.26 Although there are legitimate 
reasons to argue that adults who sell sex have more autonomy than 
children, the majority of those who sell sex experience force, 
coercion, and violence just as their minor counterparts do.27 
This Note will refer to “prostitution” as one aspect of the 
commercial sex industry or the sex trade.28 Prostitution refers to 
“the act or practice of engaging in sexual activity for money or its 
equivalent.”29 
                                                            
24 Rachel Lloyd, Girls Like Us: Johns – The Men Who Buy Sex, FAIR 
OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.fairobserver.com/article/girls-like-is-
johns-men-who-buy-sex (reprinting an excerpt from Lloyd’s book, GIRLS LIKE 
US). “The term ‘teenage prostitution’ also overlooks the legal status of minors 
who have greater legal protections regarding sexual conduct because of their 
emotional and physical immaturity and the need to protect them from 
exploitative adults.” JAY ALBANESE, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., COMMERCIAL 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT DO WE 
DO ABOUT IT? 8 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/215733.pdf. 
25 See, e.g., SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (citing one study’s finding 
that “88% of a sample of [women in] commercial sex in San Francisco reported 
a desire to leave prostitution”) (citations omitted).  
26 Id. at 13. 
27 Id. 
28 The  commercial  sex  industry  encompasses  other  trades  that  profit 
from  sex,  such  as  strip  clubs,  and  pornography.  See Sex Trafficking in the 
U.S., POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex-
trafficking-in-the-us (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) . 
29 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 1 (2013); see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-5613 (2013) (“An individual is guilty of prostitution when he or she . 
. . engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct, or sexual contact 
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C.   Sex Trafficking 
 
This Note will refer to any involuntary sale of sex, and any sale 
of sex by a child, as sex trafficking. Further, this Note will use the 
term “trafficker,” rather than “pimp,” to connote an adult who has 
induced a child to sell sex. Where this Note does use the term 
“pimp,” it relates to situations where adults are engaged in 
prostitution and coercion appears to be absent. “Trafficking” is a 
term that “seems to connote movement[,]” yet the criminal activity 
behind the term “trafficking” lies not in transporting victims across 
international borders, state boundaries, or even towns, but in the 
force and lack of choice involved.30 The federal Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines sex trafficking in two 
forms: first, when “a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud 
or coercion”; and second, when a child—someone under 18 years 
of age—is induced to perform a commercial sex act.31 
 
D.    Johns 
 
This Note will use the term “johns” to describe people who buy 
sex, both from adults and from children. Both law enforcement 
officials and academic researchers use this term.32 Some state laws 
refer to johns as “patrons” and “customers” of prostitution, and 
“patronizing a prostitute” is the most common term to describe a 
person who buys sex.33 GEMS founder Rachel Lloyd notes that 
                                                            
with another person in return for a fee . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1302(1) (West 2013) (“An individual is guilty of prostitution when . . . the 
individual engages in sexual activity with another individual for a fee.”). 
30 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Pers., What Is Modern 
Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2014) (describing forced labor, sexual exploitation, or 
involuntary domestic servitude as forms of trafficking); see also Child 
Exploitation & Obscenity Section, supra note 22 (“Under federal law, a child 
does not need to be moved across international or even state borders to be 
considered a victim of commercial sexual exploitation.”). 
31 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Chapt. 78, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) 
(2014). A “commercial sex act” is “any sex act on account of which anything of 
value is given to or received by any person.” Id. § 7102(4). 
32 See generally SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8. 
33 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 14 (2014). 
460 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
labeling men who buy sex from children as “johns” fails to capture 
that they are rapists and child abusers, evoking instead an 
“anonymous ‘everyman.’”34 With a lack of superior alternatives, 
though, this Note uses the term “johns” to encompass all people 
who buy sex, including women, despite the term’s gendered 
association.35   
 
E.  Statutory Rape 
 
This Note uses the term “statutory rape” to refer to the crime of 
an adult (a person over eighteen years of age) having sex with a 
child (a person under eighteen years of age)36—because a child is 
legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity.37 Statutory rape 
is a strict liability crime; neither force nor knowledge of the 
victim’s age is an element of the offense.38 Jurisdictions have used 
the terms sexual battery, sexual abuse, and rape in the second 
degree to connote statutory rape.39 While most states strictly 
                                                            
34 Rachel Lloyd, Girls Like Us: Johns – The Men Who Buy Sex, FAIR 
OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.fairobserver.com/article/girls-like-is-
johns-men-who-buy-sex (reprinting an excerpt from Lloyd’s book, GIRLS LIKE 
US). Girls Educational Mentoring Services (GEMS) is a non-profit started by 
Ms. Lloyd to get CSEC survivors out of “the life” and to rebuild their lives. See 
Mission and History, GEMS, http://www.gems-girls.org/about/mission-history 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
35 Indeed, a New York City study of children in CSEC found that 11% of 
the CSEC girls interviewed, and 40% of the CSEC boys interviewed, had sold 
sex to a female john. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 79. 
36 For purposes of statutory rape, though, criminal statutes typically set the 
age maximum of “child” at a few years below 18, such as 16 years old instead. 
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013) (“Rape is . . . the penetration . 
. . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . . [w]here the female is under the age of 
sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is eighteen (18) years of age or older.”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“No person shall engage in a sexual 
act with a child who is under the age of 16 . . . .”). 
37 TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“A child of tender years is deemed 
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; therefore, the child’s apparent 
‘consent’ is immaterial.”) (citations omitted).  
38 See id. § 285 n. 23 (“It is no defense that the defendant did not know the 
female’s age or reasonably believed her to be of the age of consent . . . . [And] 
force is not an element of statutory rape.”) (citations omitted). 
39 See id. § 285 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2)(a) (West 2013) 
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criminalize sex with a child below a certain age—typically twelve 
to fourteen years old40—a majority of states also have provisions 
decriminalizing consensual teenage sex (like that between Nina 
and her boyfriend) by requiring that the offender be a certain 
number of years older than the victim.41 
This Note seeks to both educate readers and promote social 
change. Using the correct terms with which victims, practitioners, 
and the public can identify CSEC is the first important step in 
accomplishing those purposes. Moreover, correct terminology 
encourages an informed dialogue about the realities of children 
forced into the commercial sex industry and the johns who buy sex 
from them. 
 
II.      COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: THE 
LEGAL TREATMENT AND THE REALITY 
 
Behind the prosecution of a child for prostitution often lies a 
history of coercion, violence, and vulnerability. Most state law 
enforcement agencies have failed to appreciate not only that 
children forced to sell sex have a history of trauma, but also that 
johns and traffickers continually violate these children physically, 
mentally, and economically in order to trap them in the 
commercial sex industry.42 Yet, the justice system continues to 
                                                            
(listing “sexual battery” as a capital offense on a victim less than 12 years old)) 
(additionally citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 254(1)(A) (2014) (defining 
“sexual abuse of a minor” as “engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person . . . 
who is either 14 or 15 years of age and the actor is at least 5 years older than the 
other person”)); see also, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2014) 
(“A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when . . . being eighteen years 
old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less 
than fifteen years old . . . .”). These terms, however, are not exhaustive. 
40 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a)(2) (West 2013) (defining 
sexual assault in the first degree as sexual intercourse with a victim less than 13 
years old, and an actor more than two years older than the victim). 
41 See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285. For instance, in Connecticut, if the 
victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years, the defendant must be more than 
three years older than the victim to be found guilty of sexual assault in the 
second degree. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West 2013). 
42 See Annitto, supra note 9, at 14; Godsoe, supra note 16.  
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criminalize the acts of child victims;43 and neglects to criminalize 
the acts of johns.44 If law enforcement bodies instead focused their 
efforts on arresting and charging johns with statutory rape, johns 
would likely be deterred; thus those who promote CSEC would 
have little reason to kidnap children and beat them into 
submission.  
 
A.     Victim Characteristics and Entry into “The Life” 
 
CSEC victims like Vivian are manipulated, beaten, and 
traumatized while in the sex trade.45 They are also significantly 
more likely than other children to have been physically abused, 
sexually abused, and neglected before their sexual exploitation.46 
Among all CSEC victims, 90% had experienced some form of 
abuse—physical, sexual, or a combination of both—before their 
exploitation.47 The onset of sexual exploitation often begins with 
someone the child knows. In the United States, “it is more 
common for children to be sexually exploited for monetary gain by 
family and friends” than by strangers, and that exploitation begins 
with a family member or friend sexually abusing the child.48  
Poverty powerfully contributes to a child’s risk of being 
sexually exploited.49 This risk increases dramatically for children 
from poor families that are “highly dysfunctional”—families that 
have suffered from parental breakup, parental or relative substance 
abuse, and histories of physical or sexual abuse.50 Children from 
middle-class families who run away from home also often fall prey 
                                                            
43 See Godsoe, supra note 16. 
44 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 10. 
45 See Annitto, supra note 9, at 14; Godsoe, supra note 16. 
46 KRISTIN M. FINKLEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, 
R41878, SEX TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2011), available at http://ecpatusa.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/CRS-Report-R41878_sex-trafficking-of-children.pdf. 
47 Id. Researchers have concluded that CSEC victims had experienced child 
sexual abuse at a disproportionate rate, ranging from 21% to 42%, while in the 
general population these figures are only 1% to 3%. Id. 
48 ALBANESE, supra note 24, at 1. 
49 See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 3. 
50 Id. at 3, 44. 
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to sexual victimization.51 Selling sex becomes a method of 
survival, as when payment comes in the form of food or a place to 
sleep.52 Children may have a myriad of reasons for running away 
from home, but CSEC victims cited sexual assault by someone 
they knew as the primary reason.53 
A breakdown of CSEC statistics demonstrates that, like 
poverty, race and gender are compounding factors for children’s 
victimization. A New York City study in 2008 revealed the stark 
racial disparities in CSEC: children of color comprised a much 
larger portion of CSEC victims than that of the general 
population.54 African-American youth comprised one quarter of 
the CSEC population; Latina/o youth another quarter; and multi-
racial youth who did not identify exclusively as African-American 
or Latina/o the final quarter of children of color in New York 
City.55 Whites also comprised only a quarter of New York City 
CSEC victims; but, according to the most recent census data, 
whites make up forty-four percent of New York City’s general 
population.56 
Despite the perception that all child trafficking victims are 
girls, almost half of child trafficking victims in the United States 
are boys.57 In the United States, the average age of entry into 
CSEC is between eleven and fourteen years old.58 Minority boys 
and girls enter CSEC even earlier,59 while transgender60 youth are 
                                                            
51 See Urbina, supra note 17.  
52 Id. See also ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 3. 
53 See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 52. 
54 CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 42. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. See also U.S. Census Bureau, State & Country QuickFacts: New York 
(city), New York (2010), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). 
57 ECPAT-USA, AND BOYS TOO 4 (2013). The ECPAT study found that 
trafficked boys received less attention because young men often would not 
identify as involved with CSEC due to shame or stigma, and prostituted males 
are seen as having more agency and choice. Id. at 5. 
58 ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 92. Boys entered CSEC, on average, 
one year earlier than girls. Id. 
59 Id. 
60 “Transgender” refers to a person who was born with sexual organs 
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the last to enter.61 However, transgender youth are more likely than 
any other population to engage in survival sex—exchanging sex 
for shelter or food—because they are also more likely to be living 
on the streets.62 
Regardless of race, gender, or other socioeconomic 
circumstances, many children are forced or lured into commercial 
sexual exploitation in one of two ways: traffickers searching for 
children, or johns directly propositioning youth for sex. When 
traffickers bring children into the sex trade, they frequent familiar 
haunts of desperate young boys and girls: “bus stations, malls, 
arcades, and on the Internet.”63 Then, traffickers “ensnare” their 
victims by building up their self-esteem, and then shattering it—by 
taunting, beating, and harassing them.64 Take Shaneiqua’s story, 
for example:  
Shaneiqua was an A student. When she was twelve 
a man approached her and told her she was “mad 
cute.” She was flattered. He took her out to dinner, 
and treated her like his girlfriend, what Shaneiqua 
called “the honeymoon period” (two weeks). One 
day, he turned to her and said that he loved her. 
Then he revealed that he was a “pimp.” He said that 
he would love her a lot more if she brought in 
money to the relationship. After she had sex for 
money, her “whole body just felt dead.” So she ran 
away to her friend’s house. Her “pimp” was already 
outside. He told her her behavior in “wanting to be 
                                                            
opposite of their gender identification. See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 
72. 
61 CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 42. However, the researchers note that 
since the number of transgender youth they interviewed was so small, their later 
age of entry could be a statistical anomaly within their sampling. Id. 
62 See id. Further, researchers concluded that law enforcement and service 
personnel are indifferent or even caustic towards transgender youth—as 
transgender people are largely castigated and discriminated against in society 
overall. See id. at 187. Without the aid of police enforcement, or the help of 
social services, transgender youth remain on the streets, plunging them further 
into dependence on the sex industry. See id. 
63 Annitto, supra note 9, at 13. Boys, on the other hand, are more likely to 
“act alone, rather than under a pimp arranging their exploitation.” Id. at 11–12. 
64 Id. at 13. 
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a child,” and running away was not allowed. Then, 
he started anally raping her. She felt like the rapes 
were her fault—she shouldn’t have wanted a 
childhood; she shouldn’t have disobeyed him. 
Finally, she felt like her body belonged to him.65 
What Shaneiqua’s trafficker subjected her to is akin to both 
“grooming” by child sexual predators, and the control honed by 
domestic abusers through “isolation, economic dependence, and 
physical and verbal abuse.”66 The offers of a trafficker might 
appeal to vulnerable children who have run away from trouble at 
home or have been ostracized and abused by their families, 
because what traffickers have to offer seems “better than what the 
group homes and the shelter system seem[] to offer.”67 
Children frequently become victims of CSEC when johns 
approach them in the street. About a quarter of children in CSEC 
interviewed for the 2008 New York City study noted that their 
entry began with a stranger’s direct proposition of sex in exchange 
for money, food, or shelter.68 Many of the CSEC victims whose 
entry began with a john’s proposition cited “being homeless” as 
their reason for agreeing.69 The frequency with which johns 
directly proposition youth highlights the need to criminalize those 
who create the demand for commercial sex, and not only the 
traffickers who supply it.  
 
B.    Emerging Sex Trafficking Statutes 
 
As anti-trafficking advocates have brought to light stories like 
Shaneiqua’s, states have begun adopting human trafficking statutes 
                                                            
65 This is a narrative adaptation of Shaneiqua’s telling of her story in the 
film, Very Young Girls, a documentary made about girls with whom Girls 
Educational and Mentoring Services (GEMS) has worked in New York City. 
VERY YOUNG GIRLS (Swinging T Productions 2007). 
66 Annitto, supra note 9, at 14. 
67 CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47. Traffickers lure young girls with 
promises of “distant places” and “employment and money.” DAVID FINKELHOR 
& RICHARD ORMROD, PROSTITUTION OF JUVENILES: PATTERNS FROM NIBRS 2 
(2004). 
68 See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48–49. 
69 Id. at 49. 
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that mirror the language of the federal Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act.70 The Polaris Project, a legal advocacy group that 
pushes for stronger federal and state laws to combat human 
trafficking and aid victims, created a compilation of human 
trafficking laws by state.71 The results reveal a patchwork of state 
laws, where penalties for traffickers and johns vary considerably, 
and CSEC victims may remain criminalized. The Polaris Project 
ranks each state into one of four tiers72 depending on the strength 
of its human trafficking laws—whether the laws both punish 
traffickers and support survivors effectively.73  
According to the study, some states fully recognize trafficked 
persons as victims and traffickers as criminals, while others fail to 
identify the crime of trafficking at all. In the top tier, New Jersey 
and Washington received high marks for enacting sweeping 
legislation to deal with human trafficking.74 Among New Jersey’s 
accomplishments were: lowering the burden of proof for the 
offense of sex trafficking of minors;75 enacting a safe harbor law 
that can grant minors immunity from prosecution for prostitution 
offenses or initiate diversion proceedings (social services as 
opposed to punishment) from juvenile sentencing procedures; and 
                                                            
70 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (West 2013). Some states have adopted language 
similar to the federal statute, or have even widened its reach. See, e.g., N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8 (2013) (“A person commits the crime of human 
trafficking if he . . . knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports, 
provides or obtains, by any means, another, to engage in sexual activity . . . or to 
provide labor or services . . . .”). 
71 2013 State Ratings on Human Trafficking Laws, POLARIS PROJECT 
(2013), http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/national-
policy/state-ratings-on-human-trafficking-laws [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT, 
2013 State Ratings]. 
72 The rankings are similar to the tiered system of the annual Trafficking in 
Persons Report produced by the United States Department of State. See U.S. 
STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. 
73 POLARIS PROJECT, 2013 State Ratings, supra note 71. 
74 Id. 
75 The lower burden of proof entails, consistent with the federal code, that 
the elements of “force, fraud, and coercion” do not need to be proven when a 
minor has been trafficked. See id. 
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training of law enforcement in human trafficking.76 In the bottom 
tier, however, South Dakota received the lowest marks for “not 
making minimal efforts to enact a basic legal framework to combat 
human trafficking.”77 The inconsistent state treatment of victims 
and perpetrators of human trafficking reveals the need to 
criminalize the johns. 
Further, even the most robust state anti-trafficking laws have 
serious setbacks in their application. Anti-trafficking laws should 
prevent minors from being prosecuted for prostitution and mandate 
specialized services—such as immediate safe housing placement, 
or enrollment in a mentorship program—when such children have 
encountered law enforcement whether by arrest or rescue.78 
Unfortunately, these laws have their limits. For example, New 
York’s Safe Harbor Act carries “a presumption that a child who is 
charged with a prostitution offense is a victim of a severe form of 
trafficking under the TVPA”—but this presumption transpires in 
court only after a prosecutor has already charged the child with a 
crime.79 Additionally, this presumption appears to be rebuttable: 
courts retain discretion to continue the prosecution of a child for 
juvenile prostitution if the child had been previously convicted of a 
prostitution offense or is unwilling “to cooperate with specialized 
services . . . .”80  
A legislative exception to treating CSEC children as victims is 
but one of the many hurdles in a child’s path to recovering from 
“the life.”81 Certainly legislators could rectify trafficking statutes’ 
                                                            
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Sex Trafficking of Minors and “Safe Harbor”, POLARIS PROJECT, 
http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/assisting-victims/ 
safe-harbor (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
79 Marihueg Cedeño, Note, Pimps, Johns, and Juvenile Prostitutes: Is New 
York Doing Enough to Combat the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of 
Children?, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 173 (2012) (emphasis added). 
80 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (McKinney 2013). Despite this glaring 
exception, New York is still faring better than many other states—it had a Tier 1 
rating from Polaris’ analysis. POLARIS PROJECT, 2013 State Ratings, supra note 
71. 
81 Exploited children refer to their exploitation—the abuse, the money, 
even the love for their exploiter—as “the life.” See, e.g., VERY YOUNG GIRLS, 
supra note 65. 
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exceptions to prosecuting CSEC victims. Yet changing the law 
requires drafting, organizing, support, fundraising, advocacy, and 
convincing legislators that your cause is worthy.82 Needless to say, 
legislative changes are uphill battles without definite outcomes.83 
This Note proposes a shift in enforcement as an alternative to the 
long road of new legislation. Specifically, it argues that 
prosecutors should use the offense of statutory rape, which is 
already at the law’s disposal, to prosecute people who buy sex 
from children. This change would properly treat prostituted 
children as victims and perpetrators as criminals. 
 
C.     Why the Criminalization of Children Persists 
 
In order to comprehend why even the most well-intentioned 
legislative fixes have not worked, it is important to understand why 
police and prosecutors continue to arrest and prosecute children for 
juvenile prostitution. It is troubling that the criminal justice system 
would criminalize child victims who are not only legally incapable 
of consenting to sex, but who are threatened, beaten, and coerced 
into “the life” by predatory adults. This injustice persists for a few 
reasons:84 (1) typical prostitution laws85 do not explicitly address 
                                                            
82 See, e.g., How a Bill Becomes a Law, N.Y. STATE SENATE, 
http://www.nysenate.gov/How_a-Bill_Becomes_a_Law (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). Federal trafficking legislation was first passed over a decade ago, and 
states are just beginning to follow suit. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, ch. 
78, (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7113 (2014)).  
83 There is some indication that bill passage has become even more difficult 
in the federal government in recent history. See Christopher Ingraham, 
Congressional Gridlock Has Doubled Since the 1950s,   WASH. POST (May 28, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2014/05/28/congressional-gridlock-has-doubled-since-the-1950s/. 
84 A variety of sources indicated a host of reasons for the criminalization of 
CSEC victims. See generally Godsoe, supra note 16. What is listed are the 
practical reasons for why the criminal justice system continues to prosecute and 
punish children who would otherwise be considered victims under the law. One 
impractical reason worth noting is that some proponents of criminalizing 
juvenile prostitution believe that these children are “bad” and deserve to be 
punished. See, e.g., In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 826–27 (Tex. 2010) 
(Wainwright, J., dissenting) (calling B.W.’s prostitution act “distressing 
conduct,” her history of troubles “delinquent conduct,” and her nature that of a 
“violent” and “chronic runaway”). 
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the age of the person selling sex, and thus permit the prosecution 
of minors; (2) the “prostitutes” are easier to identify and get off the 
streets than traffickers and johns in efforts to criminalize and deter 
prostitution; (3) police and prosecutors wish to secure 
“cooperation”  (e.g., testimony or leads) from victimized children 
in criminal proceedings against their trafficker; and (4) law 
enforcement authorities believe that the prosecution of children is 
the only way to protect them from the harms of prostitution.86  
Each of these justifications is—on some level—unsettling, given 
the coercion and manipulation that CSEC victims have already 
suffered. However, recognizing the justifications for criminalizing 
CSEC victims is necessary in order to understand the challenges of 
criminalizing the commercial sex industry, and to understand how 
the significant role of johns in this criminal enterprise has been 
woefully overlooked.   
 
D.    Prostitution Laws Have No Minimum Age Requirement 
 
Recall the “presumption” exception in many safe harbor laws, 
which leave children prosecuted for prostitution because state laws 
do not have age minima for prostitution offenses.87 Judges across 
the country have disputed whether legislators intended for 
prostitution statutes to apply to children in the absence of age 
minima. One New York case involved a twelve year-old criminal 
defendant named Nicolette R., who shared many of the 
characteristics of typical CSEC victims, such as Vivian and 
Shaneiqua: she “suffered sexual abuse and abandonment by her 
                                                            
85 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(D) (2013). The Ohio law 
states, “‘Prostitute’ means a male or female who promiscuously engages in 
sexual activity for hire . . . .” Id. The definition of a prostitute, and attendant 
statutes contain no age limits or minima. See Id. §§ 2907.01, 2907.21–25. 
86 See generally Godsoe, supra note 16. 
87 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.030(1) (2014) (“A person is guilty 
of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual 
conduct with another person in return for a fee.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 
(McKinney 2014) (“A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages 
or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for 
a fee.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02 (West 2014) (“A person commits an 
offense [of prostitution] if the person knowingly . . . offers to engage, agrees to 
engage, or engages in sexual conduct for a fee . . . .”). 
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parents,” and after running away from the abuse, she “came under 
the control of an adult male pimp and was forced into 
prostitution.”88 Medical examinations revealed that she bore many 
“scars, burns, and other wounds.”89 Yet, a family court judge 
convicted Nicolette R. of juvenile prostitution.90 When Nicolette 
R. appealed her conviction, she argued that her youth rendered her 
incapable of consenting, and thus she could not be prosecuted for 
having “offered to perform oral sex on an undercover police officer 
for forty dollars.”91 The court rejected her argument that she could 
not consent to sex, deciding rather that her consent to prostitution 
was immaterial.92 The court failed to reconcile the statutory 
paradox, and stated:  
Although appellant . . . would have been deemed  
. . . incapable of consenting to any sexual act 
rendered unlawful by Penal Law article 130 [a 
provision dealing with lack of consent in sex 
offenses], this circumstance was irrelevant to the 
issue of whether she was properly found to have 
committed an act, which if committed by an adult, 
would constitute the crime of prostitution.93 
Other courts, however, have read statutory rape laws in 
conjunction with prostitution offenses, finding that prosecutors 
have no grounds on which to charge a minor with prostitution.  For 
example, in a Texas Supreme Court decision that examined similar 
facts,94 the court could not hide its bewilderment at the state’s 
inclination to prosecute exploited children: “[i]t is difficult to 
reconcile the Legislature’s recognition of the special vulnerability 
of children, and its passage of laws for their protection, with an 
intent . . . to consider children quasi-criminal offenders guilty of an 
act that necessarily involves their own sexual exploitation.”95 
Unfortunately, the decision only protects children under the age of 
                                                            
88 Annitto, supra note 9, at 34–35 (citations and quotations omitted). 
89 Id. at 35 (citations omitted). 
90 See In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d 270, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
91 Annitto, supra note 9, at 34 (citing In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 270). 
92 See id. 
93 In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 271. 
94 See Annitto, supra note 9, at 35–36. 
95 In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 821–22 (Tex. 2010). 
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fourteen96 because it applies only to the highest offense of statutory 
rape under Texas’s “two-tier statutory rape” paradigm.97 Under 
this paradigm, children in Texas would be immune from 
prosecution only if they were thirteen years old or younger at the 
time of the charged offense (the first-tier law), while the fate of 
children between fourteen and seventeen years old would be left to 
the whims of prosecutors and judges (the second-tier law).98 The 
disparate outcomes in New York and Texas reveal the power that 
judicial discretion can wield over children, and the judicial 
system’s failure when children are criminalized in a vacuum, 
without considering johns’ culpability. 
 
E.   Arresting Prostituted Children is Easier 
 
Second, in efforts to reduce prostitution, law enforcement 
officials justify arresting children for prostitution by citing the 
difficulty of catching and convicting johns and pimps. This 
justification for arresting children—that it is a way of eradicating 
the commercial sex industry—relies on the same theories for 
arresting adults: prostituted people who are prosecuted are usually 
convicted;99 prostituted people working on the street are 
supposedly highly visible, unlike johns and pimps/traffickers;100 
and decoy arrests of johns are more likely to engender entrapment 
                                                            
96 See Annitto, supra note 9, at 34. 
97 Id. at 37 (noting that the decision rested on Texas strictly criminalizing 
an adult engaging in sex with a child under the age of fourteen, but that defenses 
were available to offenders who had sex with children fourteen years of age or 
older). 
98 See id. 
99 See MICHAEL S. SCOTT, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING 
SERVS., PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE SERIES NO. 2: STREET 
PROSTITUTION 17 (2002). 
100 See Sex Workers at Risk: Summary, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 19, 
2012), http://www.hrw.org/node/108771/section/2.  For instance, the practice of 
using condoms as evidence to enforce prostitution laws has lead to increased 
profiling of transgender women and women of color on the street. Id. “Police 
stops and searches for condoms are often a result of profiling, a practice of 
targeting individuals as suspected offenders for who they are, what they are 
wearing and where they are standing, rather than on the basis of any observed 
illegal activity.” Id.  
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defenses—that the police induced the defendant to commit a 
crime.101 Due to these vulnerabilities to arrest, prostituted people 
have been characterized as “low hanging fruit” whose arrest and 
conviction can demonstrate law enforcement officials’ 
commitment to quash prostitution and its attendant social ills.102 
The arrest disparity between prostituted children and johns is stark: 
“more than ten times as many minors were arrested for prostitution 
as were customers for solicitation of minor prostitutes over a 
twenty-five year period in New York City.”103 The hope that 
arresting prostituted minors would reduce both their level of 
recidivism and prostitution in general was short-lived.104 In one 
New York City study, for example, the average CSEC victim had 
been arrested 2.5 times.105 Another study, a guide for state law 
enforcement on effectively policing prostitution, determined that 
arresting prostituted persons—adult or minor—was ineffective in 
stemming the prostitution industry, as arrests and convictions were 
fruitless deterrents.106 The “it’s easy” justification for arresting 
prostituted minors is not only harmful to children, it is also 
unsuccessful as both a specific and general deterrence strategy to 
prostitution. Despite compelling evidence to the contrary, law 
enforcement cling to the idea that arresting children for their own 
exploitation somehow furthers the larger pursuit of eliminating 
prostitution. 
 
F.  Prosecution of Children to Induce Cooperation 
 
Third, police officers and prosecutors hold over child victims 
the threat of prosecution in order to induce their cooperation in 
criminal proceedings against their traffickers. Opponents of the 
decriminalization of juvenile prostitution believe that “an exploited 
                                                            
101 SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17. 
102 Godsoe, supra note 16 (“[B]ecause it is easier to prosecute prostitutes 
than pimps, police and prosecutors are simply focusing on the ‘low hanging 
fruit’ to keep their numbers up, rather than actually pursuing the most culpable 
offenders or changing the system.”).  
103 Id. (citations omitted). 
104 See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 89.  
105 Id.  
106 SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17. 
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youth . . . can . . . perhaps be persuaded to provide information 
against his or her pimp.”107 Indeed, prosecutors in New York City 
opposed proposals to decriminalize prostitution because they 
believed the threat of prosecution over juveniles was necessary to 
secure testimony against their traffickers.108 Though advancing the 
criminalization of traffickers is a valid objective, the ends do not 
justify the means. Coercing children’s cooperation by threatening a 
prostitution charge is akin to threatening a victim of domestic 
violence with a disorderly conduct charge if she refuses to testify 
against her attacker. Twisting the law into a tool for intimidation 
makes police and prosecutors complicit in a pattern of coercion all-
too-familiar and haunting to CSEC victims.  
 
G.    Prosecution of Children to Protect Them 
 
Finally, some practitioners in the criminal justice system 
believe that prosecuting child victims for prostitution is the only 
way to “protect minors from their own behavior.”109 In addition, 
some law enforcement officials who are aware of CSEC believe 
that prosecuting child victims is the only adequate means of 
protecting victims not from themselves, but from their 
traffickers.110 Professor Cynthia Godsoe, a legal scholar on 
children and the law, argued that the latter concern is legitimate, 
and many officers “may feel that their hands are tied” since they 
cannot “detain [a child victim] securely . . . without a criminal 
charge.”111 Officers worry that these children will be “wooed or 
threatened back into the life by a pimp.”112 
                                                            
107 Annitto, supra note 9, at 27. 
108 Godsoe, supra note 16 (citations omitted). Godsoe indicates that New 
York City prosecutors legitimately believe they need threats because these “girls 
are flight risks” due to their history of running away, the fear of their “pimp,” or 
even their love for him. Id. 
109 Annitto, supra note 9, at 27. 
110 Godsoe, supra note 16 (stating that minors are confined to ensure that 
they are “housed” away from their pimps). 
111 Id. (citations omitted). 
112 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). One police officer empathically 
asked, “How do you keep them safe once you find them?” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
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With insufficient social services available to trafficked 
children, many police officers feel that incarceration is their only 
recourse to protect children from further exploitation.113 While 
these concerns merit sympathy, in reality incarcerating CSEC 
victims only serves to further isolate and harm a population whom 
adults have continually abused and mistreated. Children arrested 
for juvenile prostitution may be more likely to return to “the life” 
once they receive a criminal record, as their criminal history leaves 
them ashamed to return to their families or destitute of 
employment opportunities outside of the commercial sex 
industry.114 The significant harms that result from criminalizing 
CSEC victims outweigh any proffered practical reasons. The goals 
of punishing these victims remain still unfulfilled, necessitating a 
change in enforcement and treatment. 
 
III.  (ADULT) PROSTITUTION: “THE OLDEST OPPRESSION”115 
 
The market for adult prostitution creates and reinforces the 
market for child sex trafficking. A sweeping University of 
Pennsylvania study on child sex trafficking across the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico concluded that “the presence of pre-
existing adult prostitution markets in communities where large 
numbers of street youth are concentrated” is the second most cited 
reason for the rise of CSEC.116 The study identified several reasons 
                                                            
113 See id. 
114 See id. (quoting police and prosecutors who admit frustration about the 
“‘revolving door’ of arrest and incarceration” for child “prostitutes”).  
115 Prostitution is often referred to as “the world’s oldest profession.” See 
Forrest Wickman, Is Prostitution Really the World’s Oldest Profession?, SLATE 
(Mar. 6, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/explainer/2012/03/rush_limbaugh_calls_sandra_fluke_a_pro
stitute_is_prostitution_really_the_world_s_oldest_profession_.html. Prostitution 
as “the oldest oppression” was coined by feminist, abolitionist advocates. See, 
e.g., Julie Bindel, Eradicate the Oldest Oppression, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 
2006), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/jan/ 
18/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation. See generally, e.g.,  KATHLEEN BARRY, THE 
PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 11 (1995) (providing an example of how the term 
can be used to question subjugation of sexuality). 
116 ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 2. Among the cited reasons for the 
creation of child sex trafficking, the existence of adult prostitution markets was 
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why the presence of an adult prostitution market would generate 
one for children: (1) an adult market is already well-known to 
“local and transient males,” enabling those interested in children to 
use the market for preying on children for sex; (2) adult markets 
occur most commonly in communities with drugs and cheap hotel 
rooms, which are also conducive to a child market; (3) police 
enforcement of prostitution is low in such poor communities; and 
(4) adult markets already create anonymity for exploiters, and 
subsequently for the children who are brought into exploitation.117 
The intrinsically oppressive nature of the child prostitution 
market becomes more comprehensible when examined through the 
lens of the adult prostitution market, where pimps and traffickers 
use a host of similar tactics to induce adults to sell sex, as they 
would children. Further, there are few differences between johns 
who buy sex from children and johns who buy sex from adults.118 
Therefore, the solution that this Note proposes—holding johns 
accountable for the harms they inflict on children—hinges on 
analyzing the commercial sex industry as a whole. 
 
A.   Characteristics of Prostitutes: Socioeconomic 
Circumstances and Victimization 
 
There are important distinctions between prostituted people 
who control the sexual services they sell and those who are under 
the control of a pimp or trafficker. Unsurprisingly, prostituted 
people working for a pimp experience many of the same abuses as 
children who are forced into the commercial sex industry.119 
Generally, prostituted people who are not involved with pimps fare 
better than their trafficker-controlled counterparts.120 Those under 
the control of pimps “make the least money, [and] are more likely 
                                                            
second only to “the use of prostitution by runaway and thrownaway children to 
provide for their subsistence needs.” Id. 
117 Id. at 42. 
118 There are, of course, johns who are specifically attracted to children, but 
most johns who buy sex from children do not have this expressive desire. See 
RACHEL LLOYD, GIRLS LIKE US 107 (Harper Collins, 1st ed. 2011). 
119 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 10. 
120 Id. 
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to be drug addicted, [and] subjected to violence . . . .”121 The 
control of a pimp also means that these prostituted people “have 
the least control over their workload, choice of ‘clients,’ and the 
money earned.”122 Although the number of adults trafficked into 
the commercial sex industry is uncertain, social science studies 
suggest that “up to 80% of . . . women and girls serving as 
prostitutes had been coerced or forced to engage in prostitution by 
pimps or traffickers.”123 This number is a conservative estimate 
when one accounts for the age of entry into prostitution, which is 
often very young.124 On average, all prostituted people (adults and 
children) enter prostitution between the ages of twelve and 
sixteen—ages at which they would legally be considered a minor 
victim of sex trafficking.125 Even for those people who are not 
controlled by a trafficker, their entry into prostitution mostly likely 
began in their childhood when they were incapable of choosing 
such work. 
Poor education, prior abuse, and economic desperation are the 
factors that not only force prostituted people into the sex industry, 
but also “conspire to keep them there.”126 Similar to victims of 
CSEC, the greatest risks for adults entering prostitution are 
“running away from home and homelessness.”127 Prostituted 
persons are often unable to sustain themselves by any means other 
than selling sex given “high levels of childhood truancy, poor 
education, poor employment skills, and debt.”128 Like child victims 
                                                            
121 Id. (citations omitted). Prostitutes under the control of pimps were also 
“more likely to have an inadequate education, to be chronically unemployed, 
and to have been younger when they first had intercourse, tried drugs, and 
engaged in prostitution.” Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
122 Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
123 Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
124 The United States Code makes it a crime for someone to use a child “to 
engage in a commercial sex act;” showing force, fraud, or coercion is not 
necessary for proving the trafficking of children. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2013).  
125 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 (citations omitted). Under the 
United States Code, a child victim of sex trafficking is one who “has not 
attained the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2013). 
126 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 11.. 
127 Id. at 12 (citations omitted). Prostitution is a method of last resort for 
survival. Id. (citations omitted). 
128 Id. 
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of CSEC, adults who are prostituted also experience a high 
incidence of physical abuse—up to seventy-five percent—and 
sexual abuse—up to eighty-two percent—before they enter 
prostitution.129 
Prostituted people continue to experience physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, and a lack of economic independence once they enter 
the commercial sex industry. Prostituted persons under the control 
of a pimp do not earn nearly as much money as the pimp.130 
Instead, the pimp retains between sixty and seventy percent of the 
money that the prostituted person earned.131 Even under the 
auspices of Nevada’s legal, regulated brothels discussed in Part B 
below, prostituted people keep less than half of what they earn.132 
Inequitable pay distribution, however, is a minor injustice 
compared to prostituted persons’ deplorable working conditions 
and treatment. In the United States, between seventy-three and 
ninety-two precent of prostituted people have been raped in the 
course of working in the commercial sex industry.133 Johns, pimps, 
and traffickers commit most of these assaults.134 But prostituted 
people are also much more likely than the average American to be 
raped by a stranger, i.e. someone not buying sex or involved in the 
industry, often because they must work in high-crime areas at late 
hours.135  
Further compounding their victimization, prostituted people 
                                                            
129 See id. For children of CSEC, up to 90% have experienced some form 
of physical or sexual abuse. Finklea et al., supra note 46, at 7. 
130 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 14. 
131 Id. 
132 See Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, State-Sanctioned Sex: 
Negotiating Formal and Informal Regulatory Practices in Nevada Brothels, 44 
SOC. PERSP. 307, 326 (2001) (describing a prostituted person’s pay in Nevada’s 
brothels as a “50/50 split” with the house, from which room and board, and 
often tips for other staff are further subtracted). Nevada does not allow for 
prostituted people to work independently of a brothel; thus, it is impossible for 
these workers to break free of these conditions. See id. at 313; NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 201.354 (2013).  
133 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 13 (citations omitted). 
134 See id. 
135 See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice 
System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1362–63 (1997). 
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rarely see their rapists convicted or even prosecuted.136 This failure 
of the justice system is a product of prosecutors who refuse to 
pursue the johns’ cases because of the high likelihood of acquittal; 
and of judges who frequently admit evidence that the victim was a 
prostitute in contravention of rape shield laws.137 Rape shield laws 
prohibit evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual history because 
such evidence would often serve only to embarrass and shame the 
victim, rather than bear on the issue of consent.138 Many judges, 
however, believe that prostitution bears not only on the issue of 
consent, but also on a victim’s credibility.139 Once the victim’s 
status as a prostituted person is admissible, juries believe that it is 
impossible to rape a prostitute.140 An in-depth study of 
prosecutors’ charging decisions for sexual assault cases found that 
the realities of what would play out in the courtroom heavily 
informed charging decisions.141 Prosecutors were averse to 
bringing charges against an attacker who had raped a prostitute—
or even someone suspected of being a prostitute.142 Effectively, the 
                                                            
136 See id. at 1210–11, 1246, 1360. 
137 Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of 
Admitting Prostitution Evidence under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1407 (2007). New York, for example, explicitly exempts 
evidence of a victim’s prostitution conviction from the traditional bar to 
admitting prior sexual conduct. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney 
2014). 
138 See Portlock, supra note 137, at 1405–07. 
139 Id. at 1405–06 (explaining that judges believe that excepting a woman’s 
status as a prostitute as evidence is reasonable because it “bears on [her] 
credibility . . . as a witness or . . . has a tendency to show [she] consented”). The 
belief that prostituted people lack credibility harkens back to antiquated notions 
of not being able to trust “loose” or “unchaste” women. See Michelle J. 
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexual License: Sexual Consent and a 
New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 75 (2002) (“[C]ourts 
presumed that if a witness was unchaste, she had broken social mores already 
and so was significantly more likely to continue to defy those mores by lying as 
a witness under oath.”). 
140 Portlock, supra note 137; see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 135, 
at 1360. 
141 Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: 
Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 213, 218, 224 
(1991). 
142 Id. 
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American justice system treats prostituted people—regardless of 
their desire to be in the commercial sex industry or not—as 
second-class citizens. To traffickers, they are property; to law 
enforcement, they are criminals; and to the courts, they are not 
worthy of the law’s protection even if they have experienced 
inordinate violence. This biased view of prostituted people is so 
powerful that even prostituted children do not benefit from the 
legal protections they would routinely engender as minor victims 
of any other crime. 
 
B.   Characteristics of Johns: People Who Buy Sex 
 
Unlike their minor victims and prostituted adult counterparts—
who are often poor, runaway, and homeless people of color—johns 
reflect the broader characteristics of adult society.143 The 
commonalities among johns who buy sex from minors, or johns 
who buy sex from adults, may end at their shared interest in paying 
for sex; they are virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the 
male144 population.145 A Boston psychology study on men who pay 
for sex found that the johns spanned income levels; the bulk of 
johns earned between $20,000 and $80,000 per year and 5% made 
over $140,000 per year.146 The johns studied also varied widely in 
                                                            
143 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7. 
144 Although johns can be both men, women, and gender non-conforming 
adults, this section discusses men because most research has delved into the 
study of male johns, rather than johns of other genders. See, e.g., CURTIS ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 79 (describing a surprising number of female johns reported by 
both male and female child victims). 
145 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (“Studies of male consumers of 
commercial sex find that buyers are similar to the general population in most 
regards, and quite unlike most populations of criminal offenders, although the 
population of johns also contains some dangerous criminals and sociopaths.”). 
Despite demographic and socioeconomic diversity, johns do seem to share 
“certain attitudes, life experiences, and behavioral tendencies that distinguish 
them from their non-buying peers.” MELISSA FARLEY ET AL., PROSTITUTION 
RESEARCH & EDUCATION, COMPARING SEX BUYERS AND MEN WHO DON’T BUY 
SEX 4 (2011), available at http://prostitutionresearch.com/pub_author/melissa-
farley-and-emily-schuckman-and-jacqueline-m-golding-and-kristen-houser-and-
laura-jarrett-and-peter-qualliotine-and-michele-decker/. 
146 FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 12 tbl.3. Note that although Farley 
480 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
age, from twenty to seventy-five years old.147 Their education 
levels were commensurate with the general population: 44% had a 
college or graduate degree.148 Finally, their race reflected 
demographics in the United States: most were white.149 Further 
studies have also revealed that over forty percent of johns are 
married.150 
While no study has focused exclusively on johns who either 
knowingly or unknowingly buy sex from children, many studies 
have concluded that most johns “are not specifically attracted to 
children”—or at least, they do not realize that they are.151 Buying 
sex from children is part of a larger demand for sexual experiences 
with younger and younger prostituted persons. One study in 
Chicago analyzed johns’ posts from the USA Sex Guide—an 
online forum where johns could post about buying sex, an activity 
johns named their “great hobby”—for three months in order to 
understand the attitudes of people who buy sex.152 The Chicago 
                                                            
and her fellow researchers found that many aspects of their conclusions were 
consistent with other studies of johns, the findings cited herein are from this 
study alone. See, e.g., id. at 47 tbl. 17 (comparing Boston johns’ reactions to 
deterrents to johns’ reactions in Boston, England, Chicago, and Scotland). This 
study of johns has a fairly small regional scope: the metropolitan area of Boston, 
Massachusetts, and thus its findings may not extrapolate to the entire population 
of johns in the United States. See id. at 11 (noting that interviews occurred in a 
“[c]entral Boston location”). 
147 See id. at 12. 
148 See id. at 13, tbl.4. 
149 See id. at tbl.5.  
150 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (finding that 41% of johns were 
married). 
151 LLOYD, supra note 118, at 107 (“[V]iewing men who purchase children 
and youth for sex as pedophiles leads to a sense that it is isolated behavior 
among men who are ‘sick’ and ‘perverted.’ It allows us to overlook the fact that 
most of the men doing the buying are what we would consider ‘normal.’”). 
152 LARA JANSON ET AL., CHICAGO ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION, “OUR GREAT HOBBY”: AN ANALYSIS OF ONLINE NETWORKS 
FOR BUYERS OF SEX IN ILLINOIS 2 (2013). Similar to Melissa Farley and her 
colleagues’ research, researchers in the Chicago study limited their findings to a 
discreet regional area: Illinois. See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 47 tbl. 17 
(comparing Boston johns’ reactions to deterrents to johns’ reactions in Boston, 
England, Chicago, and Scotland); JANSON ET AL., supra note 152 (noting that 
the research focused on posts from johns who buy sex in Illinois). Thus, the 
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study found that an “overwhelming majority of [johns] . . . state a 
preference for ‘young’ women.”153 
Johns’ motivations for buying sex range from the desire “to 
engage in sex acts that few other women are willing to engage in” 
to the feeling “that most women find them unattractive.”154 Despite 
this latter motivation, researchers found that all of the johns in their 
study chose the words “player, stud, [or] powerful” to describe 
men who buy sex.155 In addition to these expressed motivations, 
probing revealed that johns’ underlying approbation for buying sex 
derived from their “view of sex as a commodity and their sense of 
entitlement to sexual access to women.”156 Thirty-two percent of 
johns justified participating in the prostitution industry because 
they believed it “reduces the likelihood of rape.”157 
Aside from the belief that they have a right to use people for 
sex on demand, johns are eminently aware of the harms adults and 
children experience in the commercial sex industry. There are no 
discernible differences between johns who have bought sex from 
trafficked women and those who have bought sex from 
independent sex workers—most likely because johns either do not 
know or do not care how the person they are buying sex from came 
into the trade.158 Many johns on the USA Sex Guide discussed how 
prostituted “women”159 were not happy “when ‘performing’ for 
                                                            
Chicago study may suffer from the same limitations as the Boston one: regional 
homogeneity. 
153 Id. at 53. 
154 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
155 FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 26. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 27.  As one john explained this theory, “‘[i]f a person seeks sex 
with a prostitute and doesn’t get it, he can go into the park and grab a girl and 
rape . . .”; and another, “‘where there is lots of prostitution, no rapes.’” Id. 
158 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (“The distinction between people 
selling sex who are versus are not compelled by a third party [e.g. a pimp or 
trafficker] is usually invisible to buyers—particularly since most buyers are 
motivated to believe that providers [prostituted women] are involved 
voluntarily. Market incentives and fear of reprisals from pimps and traffickers 
motivate providers of commercial sex who are trafficked to present themselves 
as if they participate voluntarily, and most johns cannot (or choose not to) see 
otherwise.”). 
159 Researchers were unable to discern the real age of the prostituted people 
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[them]” and that such women wished to exit the commercial sex 
industry.160 
Beyond an absence of enthusiasm, johns saw that the 
prostituted people from whom they bought sex exhibited glaring 
signs of harm: that they were children, that they were distressed, 
that they had been coerced, and that their work subjected them to 
violence.161 While it is impossible to tell the age of most of the 
prostituted people about whom the johns posted, there are posts 
indicating johns believe that some prostituted people are 
underage.162 Oftentimes, researchers found that johns used 
diminutive euphemisms like “petite,” “innocent,” “tiny,” or “little” 
to describe the individuals from whom they had purchased sex.163 
Other posts exhibited johns’ awareness of the coercive and 
violent relationships between prostituted people and pimps. Many 
johns noted that they believed pimps were dangerous.164 When 
johns did express their belief that a certain pimp was dangerous, 
they were mostly concerned for their own welfare.165 Johns 
managed to gloss over evidence of abuse by pimps in order to 
maintain the illusion that prostituted women and children enjoy sex 
with them. One john on the USA Sex Guide spoke of a girl with 
“scars” and a “bandaid,” but reassured his fellow johns that he 
managed to get past these initial “turn-offs,” and, as the researchers 
noted, “in the end he couldn’t resist . . . her ‘little body.’”166 
Another john from the Boston study spoke somewhat regretfully 
about a person from whom he bought sex when she had to give the 
entire fee over to a man waiting for her.167 “I would have cancelled 
                                                            
that johns posted about.  See JANSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 52 
(“[C]omments on the Illinois Sex Guide about harm to women and girls relate 
more to these johns’ general perceptions [about age] than to tangible 
statistics[/characteristics].”). 
160 Id. 
161 See id. at 52–57. 
162 See id. at 52–54. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 56 (“[M]en occasionally post about pimps . . . viewing them as 
a potential danger.”). 
165 See id. at 57. 
166 Id. at 53. 
167 See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 23. 
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it,” the same john noted—because he knew she had been and 
would be physically abused—“but for my urges . . . .” 168 Both the 
online comments of johns and personal interviews with them 
confirm that they are aware of—if not actively seeking—sex from 
abused adults and from children. 
The Boston study concluded that the johns had “extensive 
knowledge about trafficking for prostitution.”169 Yet this 
knowledge failed to deter johns from buying sex, or even from 
buying sex from the specific person whom they suspected was 
trafficked or abused.170 The Boston study attributed johns’ 
continued prostitution purchases to a few factors: johns not 
considering the consequences of their actions; the significant ease 
of buying sex; and the lack of law enforcement penalties that limit 
their access to women in the industry.171 Both johns’ failure to 
consider their actions and law enforcement’s failure to penalize 
them are the exact failures in the law that this Note proposes to 
remedy by accurately implementing statutory rape laws against 
johns who buy sex from trafficked children. 
 
C.  Statutory Rape Charges against Johns are Consistent with 
Other Prostitution Reform Efforts 
 
Charging johns with statutory rape for buying sex from a 
trafficked child would be applicable notwithstanding the larger 
advances in prostitution reform. As discussed above, the 
commercial sex industry in America is rife with violence, coercion, 
and maltreatment of those who sell sex. The largest point of 
contention among advocates wishing to correct these injustices is 
how to go about doing so.172 The solution offered in this Note is 
                                                            
168 Id. Yet another john in the Boston study spoke of one prostituted 
woman whom he knew was raped repeatedly by her pimp, but the rapes, he 
commented, were only “[e]very once and a while, not every week . . . .” Id. at 
24. 
169 Id. at 24. 
170 See id.   
171 See id. 
172 See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Should Buying Sex Be Illegal?, THE 
NATION (July 30, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180835/should-
buying-sex-be-illegal?page=0,0 (describing the successes and failures of 
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meant to correct the debase injustices leveled against children 
trafficked into sex. There are, of course, larger issues in the sex 
industry, such as how prostituted adults are treated, whether sex 
work can be just that—work, and what reforms might produce the 
best outcomes for both prostituted persons themselves and society 
as a whole.173 An adult’s act of preying on a child for sex would 
constitute statutory rape regardless of money changing hands. The 
proposal in this Note would still remedy this injustice regardless of 
whether the prostitution industry were legalized or further 
criminalized. 
In order to understand proposed reforms to prostitution, it is 
important to examine the theoretical landscape of the United 
States’ prostitution policies. Today, all jurisdictions in the United 
States except Nevada criminalize prostitution.174 Sociologists 
Barbara G. Brents and Kathryn Hausbeck, who study the 
regulation of sex in America, contend that most United States 
jurisdictions have prostitution policies that focus on abolitionism 
(punishing “third-party ‘exploiters,’ not the ‘innocent’ 
prostitute”175) and criminalization (punishing the prostituted person 
and anyone else promoting or engaging in prostitution).176 
Criminalization policies are most common where law enforcement 
criminalizes all three parties in the commercial sex industry: the 
supply side (the prostituted adults), the distribution side (the 
“pimps”), and the demand side (the johns).177 
Those wishing to reform prostitution policies generally fall into 
two camps: abolition and legalization. On one side of the feminist 
                                                            
legalization and abolition efforts worldwide regarding prostitution). 
173 See id. (describing the debates between sex-work-as-work reformists, 
and reformists who believe prostitution can never be a choice). 
174 Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 308. See also NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 201.354(1) (West 2012). (“It is unlawful for any person to engage in 
prostitution or solicitation therefor, except in a licensed house of prostitution.”).  
175 Boston, Massachusetts, however has just instituted a prostitution policy 
resembling abolitionism. Zachary T. Sampson, Program in Boston Targets Men 
Who Buy Sex, BOS. GLOBE (June 4, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe 
.com/metro/2014/06/03/city-aims-reduce-prostitution-targeting-those-who-pay-
for-sex/3RR2RtPPkF4Y2P7Ain0APO/story.html. 
176 See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 308–09. 
177 See id. at 309. 
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debate, abolitionists agree that the law should continue to punish 
prostitution, but the law should re-frame prostitution as a crime 
against prostituted people; a crime that serves to “mainly benefit 
men.”178 Abolitionists are often concerned both with the treatment 
of women and with the commodification of sex in prostitution.179 
The commodification of sex, like paying for adoption, raises 
concerns about commodification of the human body, a practice too 
close to slavery for comfort.180  
On the other side of this feminist debate,181 reformers support 
the legalization of prostitution based on emerging notions of sex 
work as an occupation and women’s voluntary participation 
therein.182 Legalization advocates note, for example, that the 
criminalization of voluntary sex work has led to grave human 
rights abuses where sex workers are denied wages, health benefits, 
and equal treatment under the law because of their label as 
“prostitutes.”183 Legalization advocates argue that the over-
criminalization of sex work has marginalized—and will further 
marginalize—sex workers, and that the most practical approach to 
eradicating violence and coercion in the industry is to implement 
                                                            
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See EDWARD W. NELSON ET AL., ETHICS COMM. OF ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
FOR ORGAN DONATION: WHITE PAPERS (June 30, 1993), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4 (stating that 
“purely economic approaches to organ donation may start the ultimate slide 
down the slippery slope–i.e. the human body literally becoming a commodity to 
be bought, sold, and bartered . . . .” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); see 
also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY 9 (Farrar, Strauss and 
Giroux eds., 1st ed. 2012). Michael Sandel summarizes, “[s]lavery was 
appalling because it treated human beings as commodities, to be bought and sold 
at auction.” Id. 
181 See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and 
Inequality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (2011). 
182 See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 309. 
183 See, e.g., Sienna Baskin & Crystal DeBoise, Sex Workers Project, 
Expert Letter to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review Concerning Sex Workers’ 
Rights (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/ 
2011/20110223-upr-expert-letter.pdf. 
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regulations and government oversight.184  
Under an abolitionist model, reformers would agree that using 
statutory rape laws to pursue the dismantling of demand for 
trafficked children would effectively punish the perpetrators who 
create a market for underage people in sex work in the first 
place.185 Yet, even under the legalization model, using statutory 
rape laws to curb buying sex from children would be effective, as 
traditional consent and rape laws would still be in place. 
Furthermore, even if legalization had the effect of improving 
working conditions for sex workers, failing to punish johns who 
buy sex from a child would perpetuate the stereotype that children 
in the sex industry do not deserve the same protections from 
predatory adults as children outside of the sex industry. 
Abolitionists believe that the sex industry must be criminalized 
because it is impossible to disaggregate the sale of sex from the 
objectification of women and its attendant violence.186 However, 
both abolitionists and proponents of legalization agree that 
prostitution should be free from coercion, be it physical, economic, 
or that which is inherent when children are involved.187 Using 
existing statutory rape laws to punish johns who buy sex from the 
most marginalized and vulnerable segments of the sex industry—
children—is also a politically feasible solution before the 
radicalization of any prostitution laws in the United States. 
 
D.  The Current Enforcement and Effects of the Criminalization 
of Prostitution 
 
Despite the codification of state laws against the suppliers, 
distributors, and demand, the way such laws are enforced in the 
United States today is, at best, uneven. Prostituted adults are much 
more likely to be arrested for solicitation than johns are for 
                                                            
184 See id. 
185 See END DEMAND NYC: A CAMPAIGN TO END SEX TRAFFICKING, 
http://www.enddemandnyc.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
186 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 181, at 272–74. 
187 See id. at 274–75 (explaining the facets of the “sex work” 
(decriminalization) approach, and the “sexual exploitation” (abolitionist) 
approach). 
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patronizing a prostitute.188 The frequent arrests of prostituted 
people instead of johns are often a matter of police department 
policy or practice.189 The “standard procedure” for police 
enforcement of prostitution laws is “for undercover officers to pose 
as customers, obtain a solicitation, and arrest the prostitute.”190 
This process fails to account for the involvement of the 
pimp/trafficker or john, and yet is “repeated . . . often to 
incarcerate as many women as possible.”191 The lack of 
enforcement against johns is not only a product of policies that 
almost exclusively target prostituted women, but also one of 
practicality. Police departments often do not have enough female 
officers to pose as prostitutes in order to “conduct effective 
solicitation enforcement campaigns” against the johns.192 A 
Department of Justice report on effective enforcement of street 
prostitution determined that “decoy arrests of clients [johns] are 
open to legal entrapment defenses193 if officers are not careful.”194 
                                                            
188 See SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16 (“Historically, the police have arrested 
far more prostitutes than clients.”). 
189 See Steve Marcin, Prostitution and Human Trafficking: A Paradigm 
Shift, FBI.GOV (March 2013), www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/2013/March/prostitution-and-human-trafficking.    The 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS) study found that 
enforcement was consistent with this police method, where enforcement 
“usually requires undercover police officers to pose as clients to gather the 
necessary evidence.” SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17. 
190 Marcin, supra note 189. This bulletin highlights one jurisdiction’s (the 
Anaheim Police Department’s) new tactic to police prostitution: help to remove 
prostituted women, and focus on enforcing laws against pimps and traffickers. 
Id. Anaheim’s findings after implementing the shift are encouraging for helping 
survivors rebuild their lives, and prosecuting perpetrators of severe trafficking. 
Id. However, the bulletin makes no mention of either criminalizing johns, or 
whether the shift has successfully reduced sex trafficking in the area (or 
surrounding areas). 
191 Id. 
192 SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17. 
193 An entrapment defense is applicable “when a government agent induces 
the defendant to commit the offense.” PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 209 
(2014). The possibility of an entrapment defense may be especially odious to 
police officers contemplating arresting johns because many interpret the 
entrapment defense as a method “to deter police misconduct.” Id. 
194 SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17. 
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The entrapment defense appears to be unavailable to or widely 
under-used by prostituted people, likely because when a police 
officer acts as a decoy-john he waits for the prostituted person to 
initiate an offer for sexual services.195 
Criminalizing prostitution solely by fixating on the prostituted 
people not only re-victimizes people forced into the commercial 
sex industry,196 but also fails to reduce prostitution. The 
Department of Justice report notes that arrests of prostituted people 
“[b]y themselves . . . are ineffective at either controlling street 
prostitution or protecting prostitutes from harm.”197 Consistently, 
studies have found that targeting prostituted people merely 
relocates the criminal activity to another area, and only 
temporarily.198 
Efforts to police pimps and traffickers, the distribution side of 
the market, suffer from similar inadequacies.199 One nationwide 
study highlights that distributors are “difficult to contain,” despite 
heavy criminal penalties for both pimping and trafficking.200 With 
“markets [that] are highly profitable, arrested traffickers and pimps 
                                                            
195 It is unclear why undercover arrests would lead to more entrapment 
defenses for johns than for prostitutes. This may be because johns have better 
attorneys than prostitutes. This conclusion would not be difficult to surmise 
given that the economic means of johns are much more lucrative (or at least 
varied) than those of prostitutes. Indeed, a quick Google search with the terms, 
“criminal defense for a prostitute” yields a first page of law firms and other 
criminal defense websites, primarily representing johns. GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/ (search “criminal defense for a prostitute” in the 
search bar) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
196 MARCIN, supra note 189 (“The majority of prostitutes interviewed… 
believed that selling themselves was their only alternative for survival… 
[Further, pimps] use manipulation, threats, and violence to keep these women 
from leaving.”). 
197 SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16. 
198 See MARCIN, supra note 189; see also SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16 
(“Increased police enforcement temporarily reduces the number of prostitutes on 
the street, but they usually reappear in new areas.”); SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 
8, at iv (“Efforts to reduce prostitution and sex trafficking by constraining 
supply have not usually been successful, aside from temporary effects, or 
displacing markets to other areas.”). 
199 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at iv. 
200 Id. 
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are soon replaced.”201 The replacement process occurs quickly too 
because “[d]istribution requires relatively little skill, and supply 
[prostituted people] is plentiful and easily acquired, presenting few 
barriers to entry or startup costs . . . .”202 In other words, efforts 
aimed at addressing the supply side and the distribution side of the 
commercial sex industry have failed to reduce the crime. Directly 
targeting the johns would reduce demand and more effectively 
reduce CSEC. 
The commercial sex industry today is inextricably linked to the 
exploitation of women and children. Past efforts at criminalization 
of prostituted people and pimps have failed to contain such 
exploitation. Stronger penalties for johns, who constitute the 
demand for the commercial sex industry, would begin to cripple 
the easy profits in such a market. Charging johns with statutory 
rape, a felony offense, would also remove more johns from the 
streets, deter the johns themselves from buying sex from children, 
and deter the larger population of johns from seeking sex with 
children in general. 
 
IV.      KEEPING UP WITH THE JOHNS 
 
A. Why Charge Johns with Statutory Rape? 
 
Although prosecutors frequently use statutory rape laws as a 
tool to prevent teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted 
infections,203 to regulate teenage sexuality,204 and to more easily 
                                                            
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See SHARON G. ELSTEIN & BARBARA E. SMITH, A.B.A. CTR. ON 
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM-ORIENTED 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO STATUTORY RAPE: TRAINING GUIDE 3 
(2000), available at http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/statutoryrape/ 
trainguide/victimoriented.pdf  (listing the “devastating consequences” of 
statutory rape on teenagers as “pregnancy and parenthood, as well as sexually 
transmitted diseases”); see also Oberman, supra note 15, at 705–06. Oberman 
discusses how interest in statutory rape was “rekindled” when studies revealed 
that many teenage pregnancies were the result of sexual intercourse with adult 
men, and the costs of teenage pregnancy, such as increased use of public 
assistance, were realized. Id. at 706. 
204 See generally Oberman, supra note 15, at 706 (describing statutory 
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try “acquaintance rape” cases,205 statutory rape charges are more 
appropriate for the prosecution of people who buy sex from 
children in the commercial sex industry. Such an application is 
more akin to the purposes derived from English common law:206 
prosecuting instances of rape where there is a gross difference in 
age between the victim and the perpetrator, or where aspects of 
coercion are present. Legislatures began creating statutory rape 
laws in recognition of the special care due to minors, who are 
sexually immature.207 Statutory rape is a crime of strict 
liability208—the defendant may not assert the other party’s consent 
as a defense,209 because a minor is not capable of giving legal 
consent. Unlike forcible rape, statutory rape does not require force, 
or threats of force, express or implied, in order for a perpetrator to 
be found guilty.210 
                                                            
rape’s difficulty in “distinguishing between problematic adolescent sexual 
behavior and normal adolescent sexual exploration”). 
205 Id. at 748–49 (noting that “acquaintance rape” cases pose difficulties in 
that defendants are more likely to raise a consent defense, and juries are more 
likely to believe them; whereas statutory rape prohibits a consent defense). 
206 The actual purposes at English common law were fairly degrading to 
girls: “an effort to protect a father’s interest in his daughter’s chastity” so that 
she might still earn a respectable dowry upon marriage. Id. at 754–55.  This 
purpose would also, unlike common law, be gender-neutral. 
207 See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“[I]f any person shall unlawfully and 
carnally know and abuse any woman-child under the age of ten years, it shall be 
a felony without clergy.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
208 See id. § 285 n.23 (“It is no defense that the defendant did not know the 
female’s age or reasonably believed her to be of the age of consent. . . . [And] 
force is not an element of statutory rape.” (citations omitted)). 
209 See id. at n.25 (“Since the lack of consent is not an element of statutory 
rape, it is neither necessary nor relevant to show that the female did not 
consent.”). 
210 In Alaska, for example, sexual assault in the first degree is sexual 
penetration “without consent,” which means “that a person . . . with or without 
resisting, is coerced by the use of force against a person or property, or by the 
express or implied threat of death, imminent physical injury, or kidnapping . . . 
.” ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(1), 11.41.470(8)(A) (2013). Similarly, in 
Montana, sexual assault is any sexual contact “without consent,” which means 
compulsion by force, or “the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened 
infliction of bodily injury . . . .” MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(i), 
501(2)(a), 502(1) (2013). 
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Using statutory rape law for the purpose of criminalizing sex 
where the perpetrator is vastly older than the victim, and where the 
child is coerced, appropriately uses the strict liability standard to 
protect a vulnerable population. By virtue of emotional and 
physical immaturity—and especially by virtue of trafficked 
children’s history of trauma—children merit special attention both 
from the law and from adults with whom they come into contact. 
Strict liability places the burden on adults to ensure that their 
sexual encounters are not with children and are consensual.211  
Professor Michelle Oberman, a legal scholar on ethical issues 
and adolescence, agrees with this enforcement of statutory rape 
laws and identifies these cases “between young people and 
significantly older” perpetrators as “obviously exploitative.”212 
Oberman asserts that these cases “seem relatively impervious to 
claims that the relationship was consensual or loving.”213 A better 
use of statutory rape laws—that is, to criminalize cases with abject 
coercion where an older adult preys on a child or teenager—would 
also more appropriately use the strict liability standard against 
predators, rather than consensual teenagers.214 
Charging johns with statutory rape would not only be just, it 
would also be an effective means of reducing demand for the 
commercial sex market of children. Numerous social science 
studies and policy papers have found that tactics solely penalizing 
the supply—prostituted people—and the distribution—the “pimps” 
and traffickers—have failed to hamper the commercial sex market, 
and thus the market for the sexual exploitation of children.215 One 
                                                            
211 See Oberman, supra note 15, at 765 (“To the extent that the age of 
consent is determined by reference to maturation and adolescents’ general 
[in]capacity to resist coercion, the absence of a mistake [of age] defense should 
not be controversial.”). 
212 Id. at 744. 
213 Id. 
214 See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 483 (“[B]roader contemporary 
applications of statutory rape law [have led to] decades of absurd results and 
disproportionately harsh penalties against teens.”). 
215 See, e.g., SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 8 (“Many people who have 
studied the problems of sex trafficking and prostitution . . . have independently 
concluded that mitigating or eliminating sexual exploitation requires attacking it 
at its source: consumer-level demand.”). 
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Department of Justice study put this aptly: 
Without the demand for commercial sex, there 
would be no market forces producing and sustaining 
the roles of pimps and traffickers as “distributors,” 
nor would there be a force driving the production of 
a “supply” of people to be sexually exploited. 
Supply and distribution are symptoms; demand is 
the cause.216 
The Department of Justice study also highlights that demand-
reduction is “primary prevention” in that it “stop[s] events before 
they occur.”217  
For criminal charges to effectively deter johns, police would 
need to enforce these charges, and prosecutors would need to 
employ a charge with penalties greater than those currently 
imposed. A new law in Sweden shows the power that enforcement 
efforts can have on the commercial sex market. In 1999, Sweden 
banned the purchase of sex.218 Since then, prostitution has dropped 
by 70%.219 Under Sweden’s new system, prostituted people are 
decriminalized; police may offer them help from social services 
and if they decline, they are free to go as they please.220 Johns 
discovered buying sex must immediately pay a fine determined by 
their income or go to court and risk public scrutiny.221 By 
monitoring common trafficking networks like online forums, the 
Swedish police noticed that traffickers explicitly decide to leave or 
refrain from entering Sweden because there is no profit to be 
made.222 The law’s opponents, who believed that prostitution 
                                                            
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 78.  
218 6 ch. 11 § (Svensk författningssamling [Swedish Code of Statutes] 
[SFS] 2014:615) (Swed.), translated in Department of Justice, Chapter 6 of the 
Swedish Penal Code 1962:700,  GOVERNMENT.SE (04 April 2005), 
http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/04/74/55/ef2d4c50.pdf.  See generally 
Joan Smith, Why the Game’s up for Sweden’s Sex Trade, THE INDEPENDENT 
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-
families/features/why-the-games-up-for-swedens-sex-trade-8548854.html.  
219 Smith, supra note 221. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
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would become an even more dangerous industry for women, were 
mistaken. Prostituted women from countries where prostitution is 
legal stated that they were subjected to much less violence in 
Sweden.223 Sweden’s outcomes indicate that real changes in the 
commercial sex industry require more than a legislative 
commitment to criminalizing johns. Rather, Sweden’s police 
forces consistently enforced those laws against johns, resulting in a 
smaller market for prostitution and thus a smaller market for the 
trafficking of children. 
Studies of johns in America, too, suggest that imposing greater 
penalties on their criminal conduct would effectively deter them 
from buying sex. The Boston study explicitly asked johns what it 
would take to stop them from buying sex again.224 Eighty-eight 
percent of the johns agreed: the most effective way to prevent them 
from buying sex would be adding them to a sex offender registry 
and all of them agreed that facing a punishment of one month of 
jail time would deter their behavior.225 While a typical prostitution 
offense carries little to no jail time,226 statutory rape is a much 
more serious offense—a felony, for which jail time is mandated.227 
Some states, like New York, have offenses for patronizing a child 
prostitute, and they often carry harsher penalties than the offenses 
for patronizing an adult prostitute.228 However, the penalties for 
patronizing minors are consistently less severe than those for 
                                                            
223 See id. 
224 See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 36–37. 
225 Id. at 37. Several other studies using in-depth interviews of johns like 
Farley et al. found similar responses to the penalties that would deter johns. See 
id. 
226 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(e.1) (2013) (grading the offense of 
“patronizing prostitutes” as a “misdemeanor of the third degree,” which, under § 
106(b)(8), carries a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment).   
227 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.40 (2013) (grading “predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child” a Class X felony, with at least six years’ 
imprisonment, where an adult offender has sex with a victim under 13 years of 
age). 
228 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.04 (McKinney 2013) (criminalizing 
patronizing a prostitute in the third degree as a class A misdemeanor), with N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 230.06 (McKinney 2013) (criminalizing patronizing a prostitute 
in the first degree as a class D felony where the “person patronized is less than 
eleven years of age”). 
494 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
statutory rape.229 This difference in gradation sends a message to 
potential perpetrators: having sex with a minor who is prostituted 
is not as bad as having sex with a minor who has not been 
prostituted. 
Lawmakers should send a message to johns that having sex 
with a child, regardless of whether the sex was paid for, is statutory 
rape. Since it is a strict liability crime, a charge of statutory rape 
for johns who have bought sex from children would relieve the 
prosecution of proving that the john knew or should have known 
that the person from whom he bought sex was a child, a common 
element in patronizing a minor prostitute offenses.230 Further, 
many if not most of the sexual encounters between a john and a 
CSEC victim are tantamount to forcible rape—where violence, 
force, or other aspects of coercion beyond the coercion inherent in 
CSEC itself are present. Men in Illinois on the USA Sex Guide 
described setting “the terms of their paid sexual encounter . . . and 
complain[ed] about [prostituted] women . . . who attempt[ed] to 
resist their physical groping.”231 Johns withheld tips from 
prostituted women and girls if they did not perform exactly as they 
wanted them to.232 But withholding tips is not the worst of the 
punishment. Many johns on the USA Sex Guide used aggressive 
sex, where the prostituted woman or child asked the john to stop or 
told him that she was in pain; or other forms of violence if the 
prostituted person refused to perform sexual acts without a 
                                                            
229 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(b) (West 2013) 
(criminalizing second degree sexual assault as a class B felony where the victim 
is below 16 years of age), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013) 
(criminalizing patronizing a minor prostitute as a class C felony where the 
victim is below 18 years of age, and the offender reasonably should have known 
so). 
230 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3212(B)(1) (2013) (“A person 
who is at least eighteen years of age commits child prostitution by knowingly . . . 
engaging in prostitution with a minor who is under fifteen years of age.” 
(emphasis added)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013) 
(“Patronizing a prostitute is a class C felony if such person knew or reasonably 
should have known at the time of the offense that such other [prostituted] person 
. . .  had not attained eighteen years of age.” (emphasis added)). 
231 JANSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 45. 
232 Id. 
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condom, for example.233 Despite the frightening aspects of force 
and violence that johns use to control sex with prostituted adults 
and children, they are difficult to prove at trial in cases of forcible 
rape because issues of force and coercion are subtle, and juries 
tend to believe that, where physical injury and threats are lacking, 
the victim consented.234 Statutory rape, on the other hand, requires 
neither proof of force, nor proof of knowledge that the victim was 
a child. The strict liability standard in statutory rape would make it 
easier to prosecute johns, and thus would serve as a real deterrent 
for johns contemplating buying sex from a child. 
Even in the most extreme scenario of an “innocent” john, a 
charge of statutory rape is justified. Consider a scenario where two 
young men have sex with two different individuals—one of whom 
was eighteen years old and one of whom was fifteen years old. 
Each man sought to buy sex. Both young men reasonably believed 
that the individual from whom they bought sex was at least 
eighteen years old. One john had sex with an adult for a fee. The 
other john actually had sex with a fifteen year-old for a fee. Setting 
aside the criminalization, if any, of the first john, criminalizing the 
second john with statutory rape is merited because the attendant 
harms and consequences of his conduct were much greater for the 
fifteen year-old prostituted child, and for society. Placing the 
burden on adults to ensure that their adult activities, and especially 
their adult crimes, do not involve children ensures the protection of 
an incredibly vulnerable population. 
Recall that most johns seek prostituted persons who are as 
young as possible; many johns are violent and forceful; and a 
shocking number of johns are aware of children forced into 
prostitution.235 Given these trends, it is especially important to 
consider why the seemingly harsh standard of strict liability is 
critical. If the standard of culpability for the rape of a CSEC victim 
were modified even to negligence, the ramifications would be 
devastating. A perpetrator could then claim that he thought the 
victim was older.236 Thus, victims would be “subjected to the 
                                                            
233 See id. at 49–52. 
234 See Oberman, supra note 15, at 749. 
235 See supra Section III.B. 
236 See Oberman, supra note 15, at 765. 
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process of objectification inevitable in evaluating a claim that they 
looked older than their years.”237 Removing strict liability in 
statutory rape against johns would put an already-coerced victim 
on trial once more, inevitably devolving into a scrutiny of her 
appearance, her clothes, her attitude, her speech, and her behavior. 
The two johns in this scenario had similar culpability, but their 
conduct had drastically different results: because one raped a child, 
more severe sanctions are appropriate. 
This scenario came to life when professional football player 
Lawrence Taylor had sex with a sixteen year-old victim of CSEC 
in a New York hotel room.238 Taylor pleaded guilty to sexual 
misconduct and patronizing a sixteen year-old prostitute.239 
Despite his guilty plea, Taylor seemed to believe that he was 
innocent, citing prostitution as “‘one of those crimes’ that you 
never think about ‘because everybody does it.’”240 He further 
maintained his innocence by essentially advocating a mistake-of-
age defense, saying that he does not “card prostitutes or ask for 
their birth certificates,”241 and contending that the victim said she 
was nineteen years old.242  
Taylor’s case might evoke sympathy, like the second john from 
the scenario above, but the trafficked girl from whom he bought 
sex told a story much different from Taylor’s. In a civil suit she 
filed against Taylor for the rape, she first noted that Taylor should 
have been able to tell that she was both underage and had been 
beaten by a trafficker to coerce her exploitation.243 Second, 
                                                            
237 Id. 
238 Lawrence Taylor Talks Prostitution: ‘It’s the Oldest Profession in the 
World’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2011, 12:22PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/03/23/lawrence-taylor-prostitution-interview_n_839445.html. 
239 Jim Fitzgerald, Lawrence Taylor Declared Low-Risk Sex Offender, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:57PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/04/12/lawrence-taylor-sex-offender-low-risk_n_848109.html. 
240 Lawrence Taylor Talks Prostitution, supra note 238.  
241 Id. 
242 Larry Neumeister, Lawrence Taylor Wins Case Brought by Teen 
Alleging Sexual Assault in New York Hotel, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2012, 
3:00PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/26/lawrence-taylor-wins-
case-teen-sexual-assault_n_2025289.html. 
243 See id.  
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Taylor’s victim testified to aspects of forcible rape, wherein the 
“hulking Taylor failed to stop having sex with her even after she 
told him it hurt and tried to push him away.”244 And yet, despite 
evidence even of physical force, under the current law a civil jury 
could not find Taylor liable for his victim’s rape because he was 
allowed to present evidence that he “believed” her to be older than 
she was.245 Furthermore, it seems that in order to make out civil 
liability, Taylor’s victim would have had to produce direct 
evidence that he was aware of both her youth and her coercion in 
the sex trade246—a preposterous evidentiary standard when the 
john who seeks out younger and younger women under control of 
a pimp can simply claim ignorance. The justification for the strict 
liability standard of statutory rape stands as a compelling 
alternative to the negligence standard presented, for example, in a 
civil suit for the rape of a trafficked child.  
Bringing statutory rape charges against johns who buy sex 
from children will deter johns from participating in the coerced sex 
industry. A statutory rape charge also reaffirms that CSEC victims, 
like Lawrence Taylor’s, are children worthy of society’s 
protection. Some states allow a mistake of age defense for certain 
statutory rape offenses, most commonly where the difference in 
age between the adult and the child is small: “I’m not guilty 
because I thought she was older.”247 But the failure to arrest, 
charge, and prosecute johns with statutory rape for having sex with 
CSEC victims shows an implicit acceptance of a mistake-of-
prostitute defense: “I’m not guilty because she was a prostitute.” 
The crime of statutory rape does not penalize discriminately based 
on the prostituted status of child victims;248 if an adult has sex with 
                                                            
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Cf. id. (describing how after an hour of deliberation the jury rejected the 
victim’s testimony in favor of Taylor’s version of the account).  
247 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.325 (West 2013) (“When 
criminality depends on the child’s being under a specified age other than 16, it is 
an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove that the defendant reasonably 
believed the child to be above the specified age at the time of the alleged 
offense.”).  
248 This is different from the typical statutory criminalization of 
patronizing, which—though proscribing the same conduct—is typically only a 
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a child, that child is a victim, regardless of the circumstances 
leading up to her rape. 
However, charging johns with statutory rape without 
considering their participation in furthering a market that sells 
children would not fully capture the scope of their criminality. 
Johns stimulate an industry that sells children’s bodies for adults’ 
sexual pleasure. Most johns are aware of their participation in such 
an exploitative industry.249 The victim’s status as a child of CSEC 
should not be ignored or downplayed. A victim’s status as a child 
of CSEC should be treated as a type of “vulnerability,” meriting an 
aggravating factor to be considered at sentencing.250 Trial courts 
have the discretion to determine vulnerability; some have held that 
age is a vulnerability indicator while others have not.251 But here, a 
victim’s status as a forced instrument for paid sexual gratification 
seems impervious to doubts about vulnerability.252 Applying 
statutory rape charges to johns who buy sex from children would 
reduce the demand for paid sex from coerced persons, protect 
minor victims of trafficking, and restore humanity to the children 
of CSEC who, for too long, have been treated as delinquents. 
 
B.  The Statutory Rape Solution: Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Practical Application 
 
Using statutory rape as a charge against johns who buy sex 
from children is legally tenable, but in reality the efficacy of this 
charge turns on its enforcement by prosecutors. As with the 
charging decisions in Nina’s and Vivian’s situations described at 
                                                            
misdemeanor or a felony less severe than statutory rape.  Compare CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(b) (West 2013) (criminalizing second degree sexual 
assault as a class B felony where the victim is below 16 years of age), with 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013) (criminalizing patronizing a 
minor prostitute as a class C felony where the victim is below 18 years of age, 
and the offender reasonably should have known so).  
249 For vivid examples of johns who appear to have actual knowledge of the 
violence in the system, see supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.  
250 See William D. Bremer, Vulnerability of Victim as Aggravating Factor 
under State Sentencing Guidelines, 73 A.L.R. 5th 383, § 1[a] (1999). 
251 See id. § 2[a]. 
252 In a number of cases, courts have held that certain relationships between 
the victim and the perpetrator are factors to be considered at sentencing. See id. 
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the beginning of this Note, prosecutors have wide latitude in 
determining whom to charge, and with what offenses to charge 
them.253 Despite this broad discretion,254 there have been virtually 
no recorded instances of a john being charged with statutory rape 
for having sex with a victim of CSEC.255 As outlined in this Note, 
there are practical and prejudiced reasons for this failure. As a 
practical matter, police forces lack adequate resources to, or have 
actively refrained from, arresting johns,256 pursuing instead the 
more visible prostituted people and traffickers in the commercial 
sex industry. Maybe johns seem like less culpable offenders when 
compared to the traffickers who manipulate, assault, and finally 
enslave vulnerable children desperate to survive. Yet the sexual 
exploitation of children would not survive were the johns not 
paying for its existence. As a matter of prejudice, though, law 
enforcement officials do not pursue johns because they perceive 
                                                            
253 See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.9(c) 
(3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he prosecutor commonly has the discretion not to charge . . . . 
[and] will have considerable discretion in framing the scope of the charge.”). 
254 See id. (“Prosecutorial discretion arguably is even broader than police 
discretion.”). 
255 I have yet to find a published decision, or a whisper of a case, wherein a 
john was charged with and convicted of statutory rape. Cynthia Godsoe, who 
has studied the topic of CSEC extensively, too has not found a case of this type. 
See Godsoe, supra note 16. They may exist, and their absence could be for 
reasons other than prosecutorial or police neglect: usually only appellate 
decisions are published on commercial databases, and these cases may not be 
appealed; or johns may plead out when confronted with this charge. Missouri—
the one state that codifies the offense of patronizing a minor prostitute as a class 
D felony—explicitly refers in that same statutory provision to the prosecution’s 
right to charge violators with statutory rape. MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030(4) 
(2014) (“Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution of an individual 
for the offense of: (1) Statutory rape in the first degree . . . .”). Unfortunately, a 
search under this provision did not produce any cases that took advantage of this 
statutory encouragement by the Missouri legislature. 
256 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 79 (“Frequently, police will raid 
brothels or conduct street operations and arrest persons engaged in selling sex, 
and occasionally arrest a pimp, but simply let the ‘customers’ go without any 
intervention, or after receiving less serious sanctions than the victims or 
pimps.”); see also SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17 (noting that police departments 
do not have enough female officers to catch johns). 
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prostituted people as the wrongdoers,257 a perception so powerful 
that it holds children forced into sexual slavery to be wrongdoers 
in the same stratum as their adult parallels. 
Practitioners and scholars have offered many exemplary 
solutions to aid the problem of CSEC, such as improving state 
CSEC laws by making it harder for children to be prosecuted for 
prostitution, funding more victim services, and elevating judicial 
discretion in CSEC cases.258 But getting changes through the 
legislature can be frustrating, if not futile. Further, training judges 
to respond to CSEC victims who are charged with a crime is a step 
too late in the criminal process to prevent the manifestation of 
further exploitation. To stymie CSEC, the law must grapple with 
the force that creates it: the demand for underage commercial sex. 
Prosecutors have the power to begin charging johns with a 
crime that more justly fits their conduct: the rape of a child. 
Moreover, prosecutors’ charging decisions guide enforcement by 
police; prosecutors have almost unfettered discretion in such 
decisions.259 With regard to policy, prosecutors have more control 
than the police, who “tend to follow prosecutors in their 
enforcement activities, since they don’t want to commit their time 
to investigating cases that are not carried forward to prosecution, 
or that result in minimal penalties.”260 Prosecutors’ commitment to 
charging johns with a more serious offense will motivate police to 
actively pursue johns through raids,261 reverse stings,262 and reports 
                                                            
257 See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 80 (“[M]ost police and prosecutors 
did not regard women working for pimps necessarily to be sex trafficking 
victims.”).  
258 See discussion, supra Part II.B. 
259 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE AND 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993) (“The prosecutor is not obliged 
to present all charges which the evidence might support . . . .”); id. § 3-3.4 (“The 
decision to institute criminal proceedings should be initially and primarily the 
responsibility of the prosecutor” and the prosecutor “should establish standards 
and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal 
proceedings should be instituted.”); id. § 3-2.7 (describing the prosecutor’s 
relationship with the police as one that includes “provid[ing] legal advice to the 
police concerning police functions and duties on criminal matters . . . .”). 
260 SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 80. 
261 A “raid” is an operation where many police officers descend on a 
suspected area of prostitution activity, usually a brothel, gather evidence, and 
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from CSEC victims of their rapists.  
Although the enforcement of statutory rape charges in cases of 
CSEC has been woefully deficient, there is evidence of cases 
where the prosecution could have brought such a higher charge 
against johns. One New York preliminary hearing, People v. 
Jackson,263 is a glaring example of the overcriminalization of 
prostituted people and the undercriminalization of johns. There, the 
court held that there was sufficient evidence to proceed to trial 
against two prostituted women for solicitation.264 A footnote to the 
facts of the case indicates that the john who was to give testimony 
against the two female defendants had been “separately charged 
with patronizing a prostitute in violation of s. 230.05 of the Penal 
Law” in the same case.265 That section of the Penal Law 
criminalizes patronizing a prostitute who is less than fourteen years 
old.266 However, the prosecution granted this john immunity in 
order to secure his testimony against the two prostituted women.267 
It is unclear from Jackson whether one or both of the female 
defendants were under fourteen years old at the time of the 
commission of the offense. What is clear, however, is that the 
prosecutor would have had enough evidence to charge this john 
with statutory rape, rather than patronizing a prostitute—given that 
he had bought sex from at least one child who was no older than 
thirteen years.268 The tragedy of Jackson is that the prosecutor 
decided to pursue charges against two prostituted people at the 
                                                            
arrest offenders on-site. SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 45. Shively et al. 
suggest using raids to arrest johns, and then further suggest infiltrating storefront 
brothels, like a massage parlor, make appointments posing as prostitutes, and 
continue to arrest johns who were not at the initial raid. Id. 
262 A “reverse sting” is an operation where undercover police officers pose 
as prostitutes in an effort to find and arrest johns; a “sting,” on the other hand, is 
the more common undercover operation, where undercover police officers pose 
as johns in order to arrest prostituted people. Id. at 37 (“The term ‘reverse sting’ 
is an artifact of the historic gender inequity in the enforcement of prostitution.”). 
263 People v. Jackson, 33 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972).  
264 Id. at 221. 
265 Id. at 218 n.1. 
266 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.05 (McKinney 2014). 
267 See Jackson, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 218 n.1. 
268 See id. What’s more disturbing is the opinion’s allusion to this john’s 
frequent “visits” to buy sex, likely from children. Id. at 218. 
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expense of prosecuting a john who had bought sex from a 
child269—a john who actively participated in creating the sexual 
market of children.   
An Illinois case and a Missouri case provide further examples 
of the need to begin prosecuting johns for attempted statutory rape 
when they directly proposition children for sex in exchange for 
payment.270 In Illinois, the prosecution charged the defendant in 
People v. Jones with soliciting juvenile prostitution when he tried 
to get a child under the age of sixteen to have sex with him for 
money.271 Although the Jones defendant made out the elements for 
attempted statutory rape, the prosecution gave no indication that 
such a charging decision was on the horizon.272  
In a Missouri case with facts similar to Jones, the prosecution 
in State v. Warren made no distinction between a defendant’s two 
counts of patronizing prostitution, even though one was for 
propositioning an adult and the other for propositioning a fifteen-
year-old boy.273 Although neither of the accosted individuals had 
been involved in the commercial sex industry,274 the defendant 
here could have been charged with attempted statutory rape. 
Statutory rape is an especially effective charge for johns like the 
defendants in Jones and Warren who lure vulnerable children into 
the sex industry by directly propositioning them for paid sex.275 
The outcome of Warren is especially dissatisfying given that 
Missouri’s penal code expressly permits the prosecution to charge 
a john with both statutory rape and attempted statutory rape.276 
                                                            
269 See id. at 218 n.1. 
270 See People v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 391, 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. 
Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
271 Jones, 615 N.E.2d at 392. 
272 Id. at 394. However, the court did conclude by stating that the alleged 
acts might constitute “an inchoate attempt or solicitation offense of a different 
statutory section,” despite their inapplicability to solicitation of a juvenile 
prostitute; the court was likely referring to a patron crime. Id. at 395. 
273 See Warren, 717 S.W.2d at 231. 
274 See id. 
275 See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48–49. 
276 See MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030(4) (2014). The john’s conduct in State v. 
Warren constituted a class A misdemeanor under Missouri’s prostitution 
statutes, but would have constituted a class D felony under attempted statutory 
sodomy. See id. §§ 566.064, 567.030(3). 
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Despite the absence of cases in which prosecutors charged 
johns with statutory rape, some media accounts reflect situations 
where johns were charged with statutory rape but pleaded out to 
lesser charges. Marvell Scott, a former WABC sportscaster, was 
initially charged with statutory rape and patronizing a prostitute 
when he had sex with a fourteen year-old girl.277 He took her to his 
apartment after a trafficker “offered” her to him in Times Square in 
2008.278 Even though court papers depicted a typical CSEC 
scenario, Scott accepted a deal in which he admitted to 
endangering the welfare of a child.279 The fourteen-year-old girl 
whom Scott raped had run away, and had run out of money, when 
a trafficker took advantage of her desperation.280 Although 
endangering the welfare of a child is a relatively minor charge for 
Scott’s purported conduct, the fact that Scott hastened into a plea 
deal may indicate that he genuinely feared the prosecution’s top 
charge of statutory rape were he to proceed to trial.281 
Prosecutors have long overlooked statutory rape as a charge 
against johns who have bought sex from children, despite recent 
opportunities in especially high-profile cases. If prosecutors used 
the charge of statutory rape against johns, police conduct—but 
                                                            
277 Italiano, supra note 17.  
278 Id. 
279 See id. 
280 See id. 
281 However, an episode of Law and Order Special Victims Unit, took 
Scott’s case more seriously and used it to craft an episode where dozens of johns 
were charged with statutory rape for having sex with a victim of CSEC. See Law 
& Order: Special Victims Unit: Spiraling Down (NBC television broadcast Dec. 
7, 2011). Although Law & Order: Special Victims Unit claims that all of its 
stories are fictional, many are “ripped from the headlines.” See, e.g., Abby 
Rogers, 15 True Stories That Inspired Your Favorite ‘Law and Order’ Episodes, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/real-crimes-that-inspired-law-and-order-
episodes-2012-3?op=1. Since this episode aired a few months after Scott pled 
guilty, and the facts are extremely similar, it would be logical to conclude that 
Scott’s story inspired this one. In the episode, the detectives who found the 
runaway girl suggested that the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) prosecute the 
johns for statutory rape. Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Spiraling Down 
(NBC television broadcast Dec. 7, 2011). The Unit finally reached an 
agreement: to conduct a sting for the named johns, and arrest them for statutory 
rape. Id. 
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more importantly, johns’ conduct—would dramatically change. 
Police would be encouraged to make arrests of johns, rather than 
pass out violations, or ignore the population of johns all together. 
Further, johns who have already raped a CSEC victim would be 
chilled from doing so again, and johns contemplating raping a 
CSEC victim would have to consider both the risk of increased 
enforcement by police officers against their conduct and the risk of 
being charged with a felony offense of strict liability. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Charging johns with statutory rape would serve many purposes 
for both victims and offenders. First, the charge would reinforce 
the idea that these children are victims and are incapable of 
consenting to the sale of sex. Second, a statutory rape charge 
would provide consistency in the law for courts who have 
struggled with the notion of punishing children like Vivian and 
Shaneiqua for their own exploitation. Finally, a felony charge 
against these perpetrators would decrease the demand for child 
prostitution by deterring buyers with the threat of significant jail 
time, a felony record, and being added to the sex offender registry. 
The fastest way to dismantle a market is to dissolve demand. The 
strict liability standard of statutory rape is an important tool for 
pursuing the adults who create such demand. This charge would 
not only include the johns who buy sex from children through 
traffickers, but also the ones who engage in sexual acts with 
children whom they have directly propositioned.282 
Existing state law of statutory rape can address and reduce the 
demand for trafficked children. While this is a viable and 
necessary approach, it is not the only way to affect CSEC. 
Expanding social education and eradicating poverty are two other 
critical components in this battle. Any sustainable change must 
work toward preventing johns from wanting to buy sex in the first 
place. Our society might achieve such changes by increasing 
education on trafficking, coercion, and respect for prostituted 
people and sex workers in the commercial sex industry. 
Policymakers should envision a culture where sex is not a 
                                                            
282 CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48. 
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commodity and women and children are not objects. Additionally, 
the initial circumstances that put children at risk for trafficking—
such as child abuse, sexual abuse, poverty, and family 
dysfunction—will not disappear by charging johns with statutory 
rape. We must press on in efforts to support low-income families, 
treat children who have been abused, and infuse more services into 
disenfranchised communities. Low-income communities are 
targets for trafficking largely because of law enforcement’s general 
neglect of and indifference to their needs. However, creating the 
conditions that foster education and services begins with the law, 
and with the just enforcement of it. For children who have been 
exploited, the law has the power to remedy attitudes about who is 
truly culpable, and who is truly innocent. 
